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Does military rule make a state more belligerent internationally? Several studies have
recently established that military autocracies are more likely than civilian autocracies to
deploy and use military force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. I argue that military
regimes are more likely to resort to military force because they are located in more
hostile security environments, and not because they are inherently aggressive. First, I
show that rule by military institution is more likely to emerge and exist in states facing
external territorial threats. Second, by examining the relationship between military
autocracies and conflict initiation, I find that once I control for states’ territorial threats,
the statistical association between military regimes and conflict initiation disappears.
Additionally, more evidence suggests that civilian dictatorships are more conflict-prone
than their military counterparts when I account for unobserved dyad heterogeneity. The
results are consistent across different measures of international conflict and authoritarian
regimes.
∗An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2016 MPSA Annual Conference.
†Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, namkyu@unl.edu.
Since Geddes’s (2003) notable statement that authoritarian regimes differ from each other as
much as they differ from democracies, a growing body of literature has paid attention to the
institutional heterogeneity among autocracies to explain various outcomes.1 An increasing
number of studies on international conflict have examined how dictatorships differ from each
other in their propensity to engage in belligerent international behavior. Particularly, three
seminal studies (Lai and Slater 2006, Debs and Goemans 2010, Weeks 2012) have recently
established that military autocracies are more likely than civilian autocracies to deploy and
use military force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. These studies attribute military
regimes’ relative conflict proneness to various sources: their lack of institutional power leading
to regime’s insecurity (Lai and Slater 2006), to the harsh, post-exit punishments military
rulers face (Debs and Goemans 2010), or to ruling elites’ military backgrounds (Weeks 2012,
2014). This research is indicative of a growing scholarly interest in examining the linkage
between domestic politics and international affairs.
While recognizing the contributions of these studies, I argue that the “military belliger-
ence hypothesis” must be subjected to further critical scrutiny. These previous studies pay
little attention to the fact that political regimes are not randomly assigned across countries
and over time. Drawing on the the peace-to-democracy and territorial peace literatures
(Gibler 2012, Hintze 1975, Rasler and Thompson 2004, Thompson 1996), I argue that military
regimes are more likely to emerge and exist in states facing sustained territorial threats.
Salient territorial threats produce high levels of militarization, which expands and politically
empowers the military. Thus, the military’s capacity to intervene in politics increases when
the country is exposed to salient external threats. If this is the case, territorial threats from
neighboring countries may be causally responsible for generating both military regimes and
militaristic behavior. That is, military regimes may be more likely to resort to military force
or threat of military force because they are located in more hostile security environments,
not because they are either institutionally fragile or predisposed toward using force. if as the
1I interchangeably use the terms autocracy, authoritarian regime, and dictatorship.
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previous research argues, military autocracies are indeed more prone to militarized conflict
than civilian autocracies due to their inherent characteristics, a systematic relationship
between military regimes and conflict initiation should be found even after controlling for
countries’ external territorial threats.
My empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, I show that rule by military institutions
is more likely to emerge and persist when countries face territorial threats from neighboring
rival states.2 The same is not true of other authoritarian regime types. Second, I test the
relationship between political regime types and the initiation of militarized disputes. I find
some evidence that military dictatorships, including both collegial and personalist military
rule, regimes–are more likely than civilian party-based dictatorships to initiate militarized
disputes. However, controlling for territorial rivalries removes the statistical association
between military regimes and conflict propensity. Additionally, more evidence suggests that
civilian dictatorships are more conflict-prone than their military counterparts when I account
for unobserved dyad heterogeneity. The lack of a significant association between military
autocracies and conflict initiation remains consistent when 1) using either dyadic or monadic
specifications, 2) using militarized disputes from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID)
data, MIDs that feature the use of force, or international crises drawn from the International
Crisis Behavior (ICB) data, 3) comparing military and civilian dictatorships with or without
accounting for personalism, and 4) addressing unobserved dyad effects through random effects
or fixed effects.
When I further distinguish between territorial and non-territorial militarized disputes
and do not control for territorial rivalries, military regimes’ aggressiveness is found only in
territorial disputes. In the context of non-territorial disputes, no evidence supports military
regimes’ aggressiveness. The result provides additional evidence that territorial threats from
neighboring countries are likely to produce both military autocracies and increased conflict
propensity.
2To the best of my knowledge, no previous studies have examined this relationship.
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Overall, I find no compelling evidence that military rule increases a state’s propensity
to initiate military conflict, compared to civilian rule. It appears premature to conclude
that certain characteristics encourage military dictatorships to engage in foreign aggression.
Instead, my empirical analysis consistently demonstrates that civilian personalist regimes
is the most belligerent of all, and monarchy is the most peaceful. The results suggest that
consistent with previous studies (Weeks 2008, 2012), variations in domestic institutional
constraints are important to explaining regimes’ conflict propensity.
Military Regimes and Conflict Initiation
Many studies on authoritarian regimes identify military dictatorships as a distinct sub-type of
authoritarianism. Military dictatorships behave differently than nonmilitary dictatorships and
are systematically associated with a range of important political outcomes. The distinctive
features of military dictatorships can be summarized as follows.3 First, military dictatorships
are governed by those who specialize in the use of force. Military regimes’ greater capacity for
violence makes military dictatorships better-equipped to use repression in response to popular
dissent (Escriba`-Folch and Wright 2010). Additionally, military rulers prefer to maintain
the military’s internal unity to protect its corporate interests (Geddes 2003, Stepan 1971).
However, military regimes’ advantages in coercive capacity and internal coherence do not
lend them stability or durability. Instead, both military dictatorships and their leaders have
the shortest life spans (Geddes 2003, Gandhi 2008). Military dictators frequently face violent
ousting by other officers, followed by severe post-tenure punishments of imprisonment and
death (Debs and Goemans 2010). This fragility of military regimes could be due either to
the nature of the military as an institution that emphasizes unity, as is argued by Geddes
(2003), or to the absence of institutional infrastructure (Slater 2003). Military officers do
not tend to retain their rule when faced with popular protests or economic crises because
they value the unity of the military over political power (Geddes 2003). At the same time,
3This summary draws on Geddes, Frantz and Wright (2014) that provide a great review of military
dictatorships.
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military regimes are less institutionalized (Escriba`-Folch and Wright 2010, Nordlinger 1977,
Slater 2003). Military regimes lack mechanisms of sociopolitical control because they tend to
rely on terror and repression as a means of rule. Repression alone is not sufficient to hold a
regime together. Military regimes may thus have difficulty surviving during hard times.
Existing Studies
Scholarly attention to the different attributes of military dictatorships has probed the rela-
tionship between military regimes and conflict propensity. These studies produce considerable
disagreement about the mechanisms that cause military dictatorships’ belligerence. First,
Lai and Slater (2006) focus on military dictatorships’ institutional deficiencies. According to
Lai and Slater, the institutional power affecting a regime’s legitimacy and security relies on
whether it is ultimately backed by the military or by a ruling party. Military dictatorships
tend to lack institutional infrastructure for maintaining social control and elite cohesion. They
rely on military apparatuses to maintain political control as they lack party infrastructure to
enhance the regime’s stability and durability. Thus, military rulers are less secure in power
and more likely to initiate militarized conflict to bolster its regime by mobilizing domestic
support.
Meanwhile, Lai and Slater are skeptical that the other institutional dimension involving
constraints on leaders’ decision-making power effectively explains conflict propensity. Instead,
the only significant quality is whether the regime is led by civilians or the military. This
implies that in their four-way classification of autocratic regimes, personalist (Strongman)
and nonpersonalist military (Junta) regimes tend to initiate more disputes than personalist
(Boss) and nonpersonalist civilian regimes (Machine). Finally, Lai and Slater argue that
military regimes’ belligerence is unrelated to the military background of the leaders because
civilian rule controlled by military elites is just as conflict prone as direct military rule.
Challenging Lai and Slater’s argument, Weeks (2012, 2014) claims that their background
and training make military officers more likely than civilians to view the status quo as
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threatening and to consider the use of force necessary and effective (see also Sechser 2004).4
These pre-existing views result in military officers’ proclivity for using military force. Weeks
also disagrees with Lai and Slater’s argument that diversionary incentives explain military
regimes’ aggression. In Weeks’s view, domestic plights leading to diversionary conflicts do
not arise often enough to drive up a regime’s conflict propensity in general. Thus, a regime’s
institutional control over a society does not matter. The last point of disagreement between
Weeks and Lai and Slater is that in explaining conflict propensity, Weeks emphasizes the
extent to which members of the ruling group can impose limitations on rulers. When leaders
face a domestic audience able to punish them for foreign policy mistakes, they are more
cautious about using force. Conversely, unconstrained dictators are more willing to take risks
and more emboldened to embark on aggression in interstate disputes. However, Weeks argues
that a leader’s background is largely redundant in personalist regimes that tend to select for
highly violent and ambitious leaders. Accordingly, she orders autocratic regimes from most
to least belligerent: Strongman, Boss, Junta, and Machine, and she expects the difference
between Strongman and Boss to be marginal.
On a different note, Debs and Goemans (2010) explain the war propensity of different
regime types by focusing on both leaders’ sensitivity to war outcomes and their post-exit
fates. As leaders’ survival is more sensitive to war outcomes, and the cost of losing power is
greater, they are less willing to make concessions to other states. Debs and Goemans find
no significant difference in the sensitivity to war outcomes among dictatorships, although
dictatorships are more sensitive to war outcomes than democracies. They instead find that
military dictators and monarchs tend to face worse fates, such as death or imprisonment,
after losing power than do civilian dictators. The fear of post-ouster fates looms in dictators’
minds even when the likelihood of losing office is low. Dictators, fearing severe post-tenure
punishments, cling more desperately to power and are less likely to make peaceful bargains
4 Horowitz and Stam (2014) directly test whether leaders’ military backgrounds influence their propensity
to initiate militarized disputes and wars using their new dataset covering the background experiences of more
than 2,500 leaders from 1875 to 2004. They find that leaders with military service but no combat experience
are most likely to initiate armed conflict, which supports Weeks’ core assumption.
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with other states. Hence, military dictators and monarchs are more likely than civilian
dictators and democratic leaders to be involved in war. However, they do not claim that
military dictators are more likely to initiate war.
Regime classification Regime Data DV Predicted belligerence
Lai and Slater (2006):
Strongman, Boss, Banks CNTS MID initiation Strongman and Juna>
Junta, and Machine & Polity III Machine and Boss
Weeks (2012, 2014):
Strongman, Boss, Raw regime data MID initiation Strongman > Boss>
Junta, and Machine from Geddes (2003) Junta  Machine
Debs and Goemans (2010):
Civilian, Military, Cheibub et al. (2010) War onset Military and Monarchy>
Monarchy Civilian
Table 1. Summary of previous studies on military dictatorship and conflict propensity. MID:
militarized interstate dispute.
Overall, these studies claim that military autocracies are more conflict-prone than
civilian autocracies. However, they produce conflicting theories and incongruous empirical
results (see also Table 1). In addition, these studies use different regime-type datasets that
are built on different definitions of military regimes. We thus know neither which mechanism
is responsible for the observed pattern, nor whether the previous findings are robust. However,
since it is beyond the scope of this article to address these issues, I focus on one challenge
to the military belligerence theories: a potentially spurious relationship between military
autocracies and increased conflict propensity.
The Argument
Previous studies attribute military regimes’ conflict proneness to military regimes’ institutional
characteristics or to military leaders’ personal characteristics. However, they do not consider
the possibility that other factors may be responsible for generating both military rule
and heightened conflict propensities. Building on the literature that emphasizes a state’s
security environment in explaining democratization, I argue that military rule, particularly
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characterized by collegial forms, are more likely to emerge in states with external territorial
threats. When faced with salient external threats, states tend to engage in more aggressive
policies. Accordingly, military regimes will be more likely to initiate international conflicts
because they are located in more hostile security environments, not because they are either
institutionally fragile or predisposed toward using force.
External Threat Environment → Political Regime Types
The prominent so-called war-making and state-making literature emphasizes the role wars and
external threats play in state centralization and development, analyzing the interrelationship
between wars, the military, and state building (Hintze 1975, Tilly 1975). States facing wars
and external threats mobilize resources to build and maintain large standing armies, which in
turn require a highly centralized state to raise and administer revenues and expenditures.
Building on this literature, several scholars argue that a country’s hostile security environment
fosters authoritarianism and undermines democratic rule (Gibler 2012, Hintze 1975, Rasler
and Thompson 2004, Thompson 1996). A state’s centralization and militarization in response
to external threats interact to undermine constraints on executive control and to suppress
domestic opposition. Thus, external threats retard the development of democratic rule while
the absence of these threats improves the prospects for democratization.
Drawing on the peace-to-democracy literature, Gibler (2012) develops the “territorial
peace” theory that when states have peacefully settled borders, they no longer rely on military
force to resolve disputes. Gibler posits that contested borders generate more salient and
lasting external threats than any other factors. Contested borders encourage government
centralization and militarization, which generates more aggressive foreign policies and worsen
security environments (see also Vasquez 2009). Meanwhile, the presence of large standing
armies, necessitated by territorial disputes, reduces the costs of domestic repression and
empowers the military and elites. Accordingly, unsettled borders not only increase security
threats to the state but also hinder democratization. Contrarily, when a state peacefully
resolves border disputes with its neighbors, a hospitable environment emerges, reducing the
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need for large standing armies and decentralizing political power. In sum, settled borders
between two countries improve both interstate relations and the prospects for joint democracy
within the dyad.
Territorial Threats and Military Regimes
The military, created to protect against foreign and domestic enemies, is at the heart of
existing theories on external threats and domestic politics. High levels of external threat
pressure states to anticipate violent challenges and, in response, develop sufficient defenses.
“Even if a state could avoid the temptation to expand, being in a neighborhood harboring some
expansive aspirants meant that one had to develop adequate defenses against the possibility
of attack” (Rasler and Thompson 2004, 882). Hence, rulers develop large, standing land-based
armies in anticipation of such external threats (Huth 1996, Rasler and Thompson 2004).
External threats also allow rulers to better extract the resources necessary for militarization
at the expense of other sectors (Gibler 2012, Thies 2005, Tilly 1975), leading to the expansion
of a coercive military organization.
Existing research on interstate conflict demonstrates that a state perceives greater
military threats particularly when external threats emanate from its immediate neighborhood
and are mainly concerned with the possession of territory (e.g., Gibler 2012, Rider 2013,
Vasquez 2009). Rivals close to home pose more substantial threats due to simple proximity.
Moreover, because people tend to have strong attachments to their homeland for material
and/or symbolic reasons, and thus are willing to fight to defend it, states are likely to engage
in provocative and violent behavior in order to protect or acquire that territory. States
are highly attentive to the possibility of violent transfers of territory and actively develop
war plans based on acquiring or retaining territorial control (Gibler and Tir 2010, 954).
Therefore, rivalries with neighboring states over territories are more intense and have stronger
repercussions on domestic politics and political institutions than threats from other actors.
High levels of military preparations in turn place the military in a politically pivotal role
(Hintze 1975, Gibler 2012, Lasswell 1941). When a country is confronted with external threats
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to its security, its military is better positioned to demand and obtain greater institutional
autonomy in personnel, education, budgetary, organization, and procurement decisions.
Rulers delegate extensive power to the military in order to defend against external threats.
Furthermore, the need for military effectiveness tends to increase unity and cohesion within
the military (Desch 1998), making it better able to intervene in politics (Belkin and Schofer
2003). Hence, a military equipped with greater resources, autonomy, and cohesion is better
able to expand its political influence. As Svolik (2013) puts it, “Only once such preeminence
translates into the military’s ability to garner greater autonomy and resources is the military
in a position to intervene in politics should its political preferences or institutional interests
be undermined” (769).
Rulers face a fundamental dilemma in that any military strong enough to defend a regime
against external threats is also strong enough to subvert that regime. Additionally, salient
threat environments discourage political leaders from weakening the military’s political power
since the tactics employed to prevent the military from seizing power simultaneously erode
the state’s military effectiveness while decreasing the risk of coups (e.g., Pilster and Bo¨hmelt
2011). For example, promoting and appointing officers based on loyalty and ethnic affiliation
diminishes leadership qualities and discourages the exercise of initiative (Pilster and Bo¨hmelt
2011, 335, Brooks 2003, 162). Similarly, counterbalancing impedes coordination among
different military units, which is critical to the implementation of modern system tactics and
operations (Pilster and Bo¨hmelt 2011, 335). Once the military obtains its privileged position
under sustained external threats, therefore, the military’s capacity to intervene in politics is
hard to curb.
Observable Implications
The discussion above suggests that military rule is more likely to emerge in states facing
sustained territorial threats to their homelands. Such sustained threats expand and empower
the military as an institution, paving the way for military rule. Particularly given that
sustained threats expand and empower the military as an institution, rule by the military as
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an institution is more likely to emerge in hostile security environments. At the same time,
states tend to rely on coercive tactics (such as arming, military mobilization, and seeking
alliances) to address territorial disputes rather than disputes over other issues (Vasquez
2009). Numerous studies show that territorial disputes are more prone to violent conflict
than disputes over other issues (Hensel 1996, Huth 1996), produce higher fatalities (Senese
1996), are more escalatory (Hensel 1996), and are more likely to persist (Hensel 2001).
Taken together, this suggests that military regimes, particularly collegial military
regimes characterized by “rule by the military as an institution,” may be more likely to initiate
international conflicts because they are often located in hostile security environments with a
high likelihood of militarized conflict initiation. If collegial military regimes are indeed more
prone than collegial civilian autocracies to militarized conflict due to their own characteristics
rather than to territorial threats from neighboring countries, I should be able to identify a
systematic relationship between military regimes and conflict initiation even after controlling
for external threats to a countries’ homeland. This should hold true, because the sequential
relationship, territorial threats → military rule → conflict, is possible.
Below, I first establish that sustained territorial threats to states increase the likelihood
that collegial forms of military rule emerge and persist. Next, I test whether military
autocracies are more likely to initiate militarized conflict than civilian autocracies even when
controlling for states’ sustained territorial threats.
Testing Relationship between External Territorial Threats and Mil-
itary Regimes
The dependent variable are the emergence and incidence of collegial military regimes (denoted
as Junta). The incidence of Junta is an indicator equaling one in years of ongoing Junta, and
the onset of Junta is an indicator equaling one in the year a new Junta emerges. To measure
Junta, I use the regime-type data constructed by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) (hereafter
GWF) since GWF emphasize rule by military institutions in defining military regimes. They
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define military regimes as those in which “the dictator consults with other high-ranking officers
and can be constrained by them” (152). Military dictatorships in Argentina 1955–1982, Brazil
1964–1984, and Uruguay 1973–1983 belong to this category.
The GWF dataset classifies autocracies as military regimes, dominant-party dictatorships,
personalist regimes, hybrids of these three pure types, and monarchies. To distinguish among
dictatorships, GWF focus on “whether control over policy, leadership selection, and the
security apparatus is in the hands of a ruling party (dominant-party dictatorships), a royal
family (monarchies), the military (rule by the military institution), or a narrower group
centered around an individual dictator (personalist dictatorships)” (318). For example, they
code a regime as a military regime if the proportion of questions regarding military rule
answered by “yes” is high and the proportion of questions regarding personalist and party
rule answered by “yes” is low. A regime with high scores in multiple categories is coded as a
hybrid regime.
To fully utilize the information on military regimes from GWF regime data, I construct
a measure of collegial military regimes aggregating all military hybrids, including “party-
military” and “party-personal-military” hybrids. This coding rule is slightly different from
what GWF suggest. For their analysis GWF include all party-hybrids and oligarchies in
the category of dominant-party dictatorships by prioritizing a party dimension, grouping
only “personal-military” with military regimes and classifying pure “personal” as personalist
autocracies. Grouping “party-military” and “party-personal-military” hybrids with party-
based regimes is not appropriate for my research since military belligerence theories indicate
that these hybrids should not be less aggressive than pure party-based dictatorships. For
instance, Honduras 1964–1971, El Salvador 1950–1982, and Congo 1969–1991 are coded as
party-military hybrids; and Paraguay 1955–1993, Egypt 1953–2008, and Indonesia 1967–1999
are coded as party-personal-military hybrids. In all these countries, the military exerts
effective control on important policies and key positions of power. These countries should
behave differently than countries coded as purely party-based dictatorship, such as Cambodia
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1975–2010, Hungary 1947–1990, and Zambia 1968–1991.
A key independent variable is salient and prolonged threats to a state’s territories. To
measure this variable, I focus on interstate rivalries. Interstate rivalry involves a pair of states
that regard each other as competitive, threatening enemies in protracted conflict (Colaresi,
Rasler and Thompson 2008, Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006). Rivalries, often characterized by
mutual threat perception and intense hostility, are the context in which the vast majority
of interstate conflicts occur. Militarized foreign policies are prevalent in a rivalry context.
Several studies use interstate rivalries to capture a country’s external threats (e.g., Gibler
2012, Rasler and Thompson 2005, Thies 2005). For the measure of rivalries, I rely on two
widely used datasets: Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) and Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson
(2008). Klein et al. emphasize the occurrence of militarized disputes in conceptualizing
rivalry relationships and define a rivalry as a dyadic relationship in which two states engage in
militarized disputes at least three times over the same set of issues. Conversely, the Colaresi
et al. data employ a perception-based approach to identify strategic rivalry. They focus on
leaders’ perception, by evaluating leader statements and historical narratives, rather than on
actual dispute participation. I employ both measures because I expect that both participation
in repeated militarized disputes and perceived military threats affect the need for security
and military build-ups. For the measure of strategic rivalry, I use the Thompson and Dreyer
(2011) dataset that updates the Colaresi et al. dataset and covers the time period from 1816
to 2010.
To explore the effect of territorial threats, I distinguish rivalries competing over territorial
issues or sharing land borders (what I call territorial rivalries) from rivalries competing over
other issues or not sharing land borders. To this end, when I employ strategic rivalry, I
utilize spatial rivalries as coded in Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2008). Colaresi et al.
distinguish between spatial rivalries primarily concerned with territorial issues and positional
rivalries concerned with power position. I measure Territorial rivalry (strategic) as
a dichotomous variable that takes the value one when a country is involved in at least one
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spatial rivalry in the prior year, and zero otherwise. Nonterritorial rivalry (strategic)
is an indicator for countries that experience strategic rivalry but no spatial rivalry. For the
Klein et al. rivalry measure, I create a binary variable Territorial rivalry (KGD) that
is coded one when a rivalry’s most frequent reason for militarized disputes is territory.5
Nonterritorial rivalry (KGD) includes the remaining rivalries.
I also include control variables. First, I include an indicator of civil war taken from the
Correlates of War data (Sarkees and Schafer 2000) to capture the possibility that internal
conflicts encourage the military to take on a more active political role (Desch 1998). A
binary indicator of internal armed conflicts is coded as one for country-years with at least one
corresponding internal conflict occurring in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Second, I
control for regime type by including dichotomous indicators for democracies and anocracies.
Regimes that score above 5 in the previous year are classified as democracies while those that
score between -5 and 5 in the previous year are classified as anocracies. Next, I include a
natural log of real GDP per capita and the annual percentage change of real GDP per capita.6
Fourth, global and regional environments may influence the establishment of military regimes.
This is captured by a dummy variable for the post-Cold War period and the proportion
of democratic neighbors.7 Last, I include a natural log of the amount of the time elapsed
between the last regime change and the military regime’s emergence to control for potential
negative duration dependence.
Figure 1 displays the estimated coefficients of territorial and non-territorial rivalries
along with their standard errors from logit regressions. The full regression tables are reported
in Table A1 of the Supporting Appendix. Models 1 and 2 examine regime onset,8 and Models
5I thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to use the percentage of territorial revisions. I use
the two state-level revision type variables in the MID data to identify whether a territorial revision was
sought. If territory is a motivation for either state, I record this as a territorial dispute, and otherwise, as a
non-territorial MID.
6Data on GDP per capita are taken from Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2011).
7 I define a country’s neighbors to be countries with a minimum distance of 1001 km, as reported in the
cshapes R library.
8I restrict the sample to countries that did not experience military rule in the previous year by setting
ongoing years to missing.
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Model 4: Regime Incidence 
 Spatial rivalry (Strategic)
Model 3: Regime Incidence
 Contiguous rivalry (KGD)
Model 2: Regime Onset 
 Spatial rivalry (Strategic)
Model 1: Regime Onset 
 Contiguous rivalry (KGD)
−2 −1 0 1 −2 −1 0 1 −2 −1 0 1 −2 −1 0 1
l lTerritorial Non−territorial
Figure 1. Association Between Territorial Rivalries and Different Types of Autocracies.
The graph shows the logit regression coefficients from separately estimated models. Circles
show the point estimates, and horizontal line segments associated with circles show the 95%
confidence intervals. All models include full control variables.
3 and 4 analyze regime incidence.9
Regardless of whether I examine regime incidence or onset, the left-most panel of Figure 1
shows that the coefficients on Territorial rivalry (KGD), built on the dispute-density ap-
proach, and Territorial rivalry (Strategic), based on the perception-based approach,
are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, which comports with my argument.10
This suggests that Junta is more likely to emerge when a country has engaged in a series of
militarized disputes fought over territory or has long-standing competition with rivals over
territorial controls. Substantively, collegial military regimes are about three (when using
Territorial rivalry (KGD)) or twice (when using Territorial rivalry (Strategic))
more likely to emerge when a country has territorial rivalries than when it has no rivalries. On
the other hand, Nonterritorial rivalry (KGD) and Nonterritorial rivalry (Strate-
gic) are not significantly associated with Junta, which confirms the importance of territorial
9I include a lagged dependent variable since a political regime is highly persistent, and ignoring dynamics
will bias the estimated effect of any covariates that are positively serially correlated.
10 I also fit models using country random effects. I fail to find significant variance terms in random effects
specifications, and results remain similar to those reported in Figure 1.
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threats.
For comparison, I examine the impact of territorial and non-territorial rivalries on other
authoritarian regime types (see the next section for how to measure them). Figure 1 suggests
no systematic relationship between territorial rivalries and other authoritarian regimes.
Testing the Relationship between Military Regimes and Conflict
Initiation
Next, I test whether military dictatorships are more likely to initiate militarized conflict
than civilian dictatorships when I control for a country’s territorial threats increasing the
probability of dispute behavior. Previous studies characterize military belligerence as a
monadic effect of military autocracies, operating independently of both domestic political
conditions in other states and interactions with other states. However, they use different
empirical strategies: Lai and Slater (2006) and Debs and Goemans (2010) use monadic tests
in which country-years are the unit of analysis while Weeks (2012, 2014) employs dyadic
tests in which directed dyad-years are the unit of analysis. To ensure robustness, I use both
monadic and dyadic specifications.
To code conflict initiation, I use the Correlates of War MID dataset, and for purposes of
comparison, focus on “Side A,” the state that initiated the first militarized move, because Lai
and Slater (2006) and Weeks (2012, 2014) use the same dependent variable. As Ghosn and
Bremer (2004, 38–39) note, however, the state on Side A is not necessarily responsible for the
conflict. “If a country perceives a potential threat, it may choose to attack first, and it is
not clear that data focusing on the direction of attack are always able to account for such
preemptive strikes” (Caselli, Morelli and Rohner 2015). Thus, I also examine MID initiation
in terms of “revisionist” that sought to revise the status quo by force. In monadic models,
the dependent variable is a count of a country’s total number of MID initiations in year t+ 1.
In dyadic tests, the dependent variable is a dummy variable coded one if State A initiated a
new MID against State B in the directed dyad in year t+ 1, and zero otherwise. The time
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period for the empirical analysis is 1946 to 2000.
A potential concern is that the MID dataset includes many minor disputes, not explicitly
authorized by state leaders, and non-interstate conflict cases (Downes and Sechser 2012, 463–
464). The inclusion of these cases may be problematic since the theories under examination
explicitly focus on political leaders’ choices to engage in militarized disputes. To address this
concern, I also limit MIDs only to those in which force is used.11 Additionally, I employ the
initiation of international crises as coded in the ICB project. The ICB project specifies two
defining conditions for an international crisis: “(1) a change in type and/or an increase in
intensity of disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interactions between two or more
states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes
their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system–global, dominant,
or subsystem” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, 4-5). The ICB dataset is attractive in that it
excludes conflicts resulting from unauthorized or “accidental” uses of force.12
Following previous studies (Lai and Slater 2006, Weeks 2012, 2014), I differentiate
between authoritarian regimes using personalism dimension as well as military-civilian
dimension: personalist military (Strongman), personalist civilian (Boss), nonpersonalist
military (Junta), and nonpersonalist civilian regimes (Machine). To measure autocratic
regimes, I again use the GWF regime-type data. As explained above, GWF military regimes
measure the rule by the military, corresponding to Junta. To measure Strongman, I follow
Geddes, Frantz and Wright’s (2014) recommendation: a country-year qualifies as military
strongman rule when it is coded both as personalist by GWF and as military by Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010). The Cheibub et al. classification of dictatorships depends
solely on the identity of the regime leader without considering institutional configurations and
11Use of force equals one if the hostility level of a MID is coded as 4 or 5, and State A is Side A or a
revisionist state in a new dyadic MID against State B.
12One challenge here is that the ICB dataset identifies neither conflictual dyads nor initiators. I rely on
Mettler and Reiter (2013) for the information on crisis initiation from 1946 to 2007. They assigned the
challenger status to “the state that made the first threat, mobilized its forces first, or used violence first” after
identifying all the conflictual dyads within all ICB crises (861). They also exclude ICB crises that included
only a single state.
16
the composition of the political leadership. It codes a dictatorship as a military dictatorship
if the effective leader is or was a current or former military officer prior to seizing power.
Thus, military dictatorships coded by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland identify military-led
autocracies, and the strategy of combining the GWF dataset with the Cheibub et al. dataset
can measure military strongman rule, a subset of military-led autocracies. Idi Amin in
Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo in the
Dominican Republic, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya are notable examples of Strongman.
Additionally, I include two civilian counterparts, Boss and Machine. I code the remaining
civilian personalist regimes in GWF data as Boss. Dominant-party dictatorships, including
“party-based,”“party-personal,” and “oligarchy,” are coded Machine. In addition to these four
autocratic regimes, I include Monarchy as a separate regime category. Lai and Slater (2006)
and Weeks (2012, 2014) do not consider the conflict propensity of monarchies, theorizing
military dictatorships’ belligerence only compared to civilian dictatorships. In contrast, Debs
and Goemans (2010) argue that monarchs would be more war-prone than civilian autocrats
because of their adverse post-ouster fates. Last, about two percent of all country-years are
coded as “Not independent,”“Occupied by foreign troops,”“Ruled by a provisional government
charged with overseeing a transition to democracy,” or “Lacking a central government.” I
code these country-years as Others and include it in the model instead of removing these
observations.
I include a set of control variables that might be correlated with political regime type and
international conflict. First, I include a state’s national military capabilities, as measured by a
state’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score and a binary indicator of major
power status in the international system, both as coded in the COW project. Dyadic models
control for each state’s military capabilities and major power status, and additionally include
an initiator’s proportion of dyadic capabilities. Second, I include a measure of geographic
conditions. In the monadic analysis, I include the number of contiguous territorial borders
with other states (separated by a land or river border). In the dyadic analysis, I include a
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dummy variable for contiguity. Last, I control for a state’s alliances. Monadic tests include
the total number of a state’s allies, as measured in the COW Alliance data (Gibler 2009).
Dyadic models include the similarity of the two states’ alliance portfolios. To control for
duration dependence, I include a cubic polynomial of the number of years since the last MID
initiation.
To control for potential unobserved unit-specific factors, I follow King’s (2001) suggestion
to use random-effects models. I thus include country-level random effects for the monadic
analysis and dyad-level random effects for the dyadic analysis. A pooled model maintains a
very strong assumption that the average rate of conflict initiation is the same for all countries
(or dyads), and that control variables fully account for the unobservable determinants of a
country’s belligerence that may be spuriously correlated with regime type. Countries that
have more frequently been under military rule may be fundamentally different from countries
that have not. A pooled regression will be heavily confounded with other factors likely to
be simultaneously correlated with military regimes and conflict propensity. I also use a
conditional fixed effect logit model as an alternative estimator but report the results in the
Supporting Appendix due to space considerations.
Dyadic Tests
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the twelve different models in which the dependent variable
is Side A initiation (Table 2) or Revisionist initiation (Table 3). For comparison,
I present both pooled and random effects logit estimates. However, likelihood-ratio tests
indicate that there is significant unobserved heterogeneity at directed-dyad level, confirming
the need to account for these differences. All the models include six regime-type dummy
variables for State A and set Democracy as the baseline category. To test whether military
autocracies are more likely to engage in militarized foreign policies than civilian autocracies,
I compare the coefficients of military autocracies with those of civilian autocracies. I report
the p-values of two-tailed Wald tests assessing the statistical significance of the differences at
the bottom of the tables. If hostile security environments of Junta contribute to its conflict
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propensity, the belligerence of Junta will disappear when I control for territorial threats.
Otherwise, I should be able to identify the belligerence of Junta compared to other civilian
autocracies even when I include territorial threats.
I begin with a pooled logit model that does not include a country’s threat environments.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows that Machine is the least aggressive and not statistically different
from democracies, but another civilian autocracy, Boss, is the most aggressive of all. The
differences not only between Machine and military autocracies but also between Boss and
military autocracies are statistically significant. No previous research on the military belliger-
ence predicts that Boss is more aggressive internationally than Strongman. Only Junta >
Machine is consistent with previous studies.
Column 2 adds two variables measuring territorial rivalries, Territorial rivalry
(strategic) and Territorial rivalry (KGD), to Column 1. As expected, all territorial
rivalry indicators have positive and statistically significant coefficients, which is consistent
with existing research (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2008, Diehl and Goertz 2001). A
country is more likely to initiate militarized disputes against its territorial rivals than against
other countries. Additionally, both Strategic rivalry and KGD rivalry are positive and
statistically significant. This confirms that they capture different aspects of interstate rival
relationships. Once I control for a potential initiator’s external security environment, Junta
decreases in magnitude, but Machine increases. Consequently, the statistical difference
between Junta and Machine disappears. Interestingly, Strongman also decrease in magnitude,
making the relative aggressiveness of Boss greater.
A similar pattern emerges when I include interstate rivalries including both territorial
and non-territorial rivalries in Column 3. The coefficients on Junta and Strongman decline
more in magnitude, and the coefficient on Machine increases, making Machine more belligerent
than military autocracies. Thus, the ordering Boss > Machine > Junta > Strongman is
found. This is the opposite of what the military belligerence hypothesis predicts.
Columns 4 through 6, my preferred specifications, add dyad random effects to the
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.589*** 0.528*** 0.270* 0.307** 0.244* 0.153
(0.152) (0.159) (0.152) (0.136) (0.137) (0.137)
Machine 0.210 0.296** 0.313*** 0.416*** 0.462*** 0.404***
(0.134) (0.142) (0.115) (0.130) (0.129) (0.117)
Strongman 0.612*** 0.614*** 0.110 0.564*** 0.496*** 0.189
(0.162) (0.168) (0.144) (0.177) (0.169) (0.173)
Boss 0.934*** 1.009*** 0.870*** 1.197*** 1.209*** 1.159***
(0.156) (0.154) (0.152) (0.167) (0.167) (0.155)
Monarchy -0.129 -0.156 -0.417** -0.727***-0.762***-0.533**
(0.222) (0.205) (0.191) (0.226) (0.225) (0.217)
Others 0.247 0.327 -0.122 0.210 0.328 -0.171
(0.398) (0.415) (0.359) (0.418) (0.417) (0.369)
Power Parity 0.429*** 0.488*** 0.516*** 0.718*** 0.751*** 0.739***
(0.155) (0.154) (0.162) (0.166) (0.167) (0.158)
Alliance Similarity -0.774***-0.757***-0.230 -0.677***-0.659***-0.367**
(0.153) (0.160) (0.156) (0.198) (0.201) (0.178)
Contiguous Dyad 3.741*** 3.378*** 1.910*** 5.193*** 4.603*** 2.998***
(0.128) (0.148) (0.228) (0.205) (0.217) (0.206)
Trade Dependence -2.145 2.120 8.195 6.256 6.332 8.114
(6.761) (5.178) (6.792) (7.755) (7.992) (6.932)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.688*** 1.446***
(0.208) (0.219)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.447*** 2.335***
(0.233) (0.205)
Strategic rivalry 0.398*** 1.080***
(0.140) (0.161)
KGD rivalry 3.900*** 3.584***
(0.222) (0.164)
Constant -5.821***-6.115***-7.470***-9.753***-9.838***-9.451***
(0.194) (0.226) (0.230) (0.343) (0.327) (0.286)
Variance(Dyad RE) 4.707*** 4.241*** 1.714***
(0.448) (0.415) (0.244)
Test of equality (p-values)
Junta=Machine 0.02 0.19 0.80 0.48 0.16 0.10
Junta=Boss 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.39 0.84 0.21
Strongman=Boss 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -6085.6 -5943.8 -5224.4 -5585.6 -5463.2 -5062.2
Table 2. MID Initiation (Side A) in Directed-Dyad Years. Logit estimates with standard errors
clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include each state’s military capabilities, the
major power status of each state in the dyad, and a cubic polynomial of peace years (not reported).
All regime variables are lagged by one year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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specifications of Columns 1 through 3. These models provide no evidence that military
autocracies initiate MIDs at a higher rate than their civilian counterparts, irrespective of
whether I include territorial rivalries or not. The results indicate the opposite: not only
Boss but also Machine are more conflict-prone than their military counterparts although the
difference between Machine and Junta is not statistically different.
The examination of Revisionist initiation also fails to provide a strong support
for the relationship between military regimes and conflict initiation. In Column 1 of Tables
3, the pooled logit model, Junta and Strongman are more belligerent than Machine, but
only the difference between Strongman and Machine is statistically significant. However, the
inclusion of territorial rivalries wipes out the difference between Junta and Machine and
substantially reduces the difference between Strongman and Machine (Column 2). When
Column 3 includes interstate rivalries, I find Boss > Machine > Strongman ≈ Junta. Finally,
random effects models, reported in Columns 4 through 6, consistently show that Machine
initiates MIDs at a higher annual rate than Junta, a difference significant at the 5% level.
As in other models, Boss remains more belligerent than Strongman.
Overall, no evidence indicates that military rule makes states more aggressive inter-
nationally than civilian rule. All models demonstrate that civilian personalist autocracies
are more belligerent than both types of military autocracies, a difference statistically signifi-
cant. The only evidence for Junta > Machine comes from Column 1 of Table 2, the pooled
model of Side A initiation. However, the association between military rule and conflict
propensity is not robust to including dyad random effects or rivalry relationships. Combined
with the finding displayed in Figure 1, this suggests that the conflict-proneness of collegial
(and personalist) military dictatorships, compared to elite-constrained party dictatorships,
seems driven by countries’ external threat environments rather than by regimes’ inherent
characteristics.
It is worth noting that controlling external threat environments does not wipe away
the differences among authoritarian regimes. The results consistently show that Boss initi-
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.589*** 0.526*** 0.245 0.255 0.225 0.136
(0.185) (0.189) (0.180) (0.167) (0.167) (0.169)
Machine 0.374*** 0.445*** 0.465*** 0.613*** 0.652*** 0.590***
(0.144) (0.145) (0.122) (0.143) (0.142) (0.129)
Strongman 0.750*** 0.729*** 0.243 0.729*** 0.671*** 0.358*
(0.176) (0.172) (0.155) (0.195) (0.184) (0.184)
Boss 1.095*** 1.147*** 0.988*** 1.387*** 1.393*** 1.297***
(0.173) (0.166) (0.165) (0.180) (0.181) (0.171)
Monarchy -0.196 -0.244 -0.517** -0.823***-0.838***-0.611**
(0.298) (0.264) (0.263) (0.296) (0.289) (0.287)
Others -0.401 -0.331 -0.734 -0.370 -0.170 -0.562
(0.512) (0.518) (0.507) (0.554) (0.522) (0.502)
Power Parity 0.525*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.905*** 0.924*** 0.860***
(0.179) (0.174) (0.184) (0.185) (0.185) (0.179)
Alliance Similarity -0.662***-0.610***-0.075 -0.494** -0.474** -0.184
(0.173) (0.180) (0.169) (0.219) (0.222) (0.195)
Contiguous Dyad 3.710*** 3.345*** 1.741*** 5.198*** 4.637*** 2.843***
(0.144) (0.164) (0.254) (0.241) (0.252) (0.233)
Trade Dependence 0.821 3.276 11.849** 9.123 8.260 10.535
(6.432) (5.159) (5.835) (7.449) (7.834) (6.683)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.881*** 1.298***
(0.245) (0.259)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.227*** 2.107***
(0.269) (0.251)
Strategic rivalry 0.392** 0.969***
(0.152) (0.186)
KGD rivalry 3.949*** 3.561***
(0.244) (0.189)
Constant -6.189***-6.427***-7.652***-10.558***-10.503***-9.794***
(0.234) (0.254) (0.245) (0.420) (0.401) (0.336)
Variance(Dyad RE) 5.386*** 4.844*** 1.893***
(0.578) (0.537) (0.287)
Test of equality (p-values)
Junta=Machine 0.25 0.68 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.01
Junta=Boss 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.54 0.92 0.19
Strongman=Boss 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -4991.5 -4886.1 -4279.0 -4554.5 -4480.7 -4146.0
Table 3. MID Initiation (Revisionist) in Directed-Dyad Years. Logit estimates with standard errors
clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include each state’s military capabilities, the
major power status of each state in the dyad, and a cubic polynomial of peace years (not reported).
All regime variables are lagged by one year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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ates MIDs at the highest annual rate. Similarly, the differences between democracies and
monarchies on the one hand and other types of autocracies remain significant. Particularly,
monarchies initiate MIDs at the lowest rate. The probability of MID initiation for Boss is
about three times greater than for Democracy and about six times greater than for Monarchy.
Monadic Tests
Tables 4 and A7 report the result of monadic tests using a negative binomial model in which the
dependent variable is the number of MID initiations in a given year. Table 4 examines Side A
initiation, and Table A7 (reported in the appendix) examines Revisionist initiation.
I again report both the results of pooled and random effects models.13 Most models offer
common results. First, Machine is likely to initiate more MIDs than Junta and Strongman,
although the differences are not statistically distinguishable from zero.14 Second, the inclusion
of security environments decreases the coefficients on both military regimes, but does not
much affect the coefficients on civilian autocracies. All rivalry indicators have positive and
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that a country is more likely to engage in
foreign aggression when it resides in hostile neighborhoods. Last, Boss is the most aggressive
internationally, and Monarchy is the least aggressive of all. In sum, monadic tests show little
empirical relationship between military regimes and conflict propensity. These results provide
no support for the idea that military autocracies are more belligerent than civilian autocracies
due to their inherent characteristics or leaders’ personal backgrounds.
Testing Additional Implication: Differentiating Between Territorial and Non-
territorial MIDs
I test an additional observable implication that flows from my argument. If territorial threats
from neighboring countries tend to produce both Junta and increased conflict propensity,
13I use menbreg in Stata 14 that can account for unobserved unit effects unlike xtnbreg that addresses
only between-unit variation in the dispersion parameter. Likelihood-ratio tests reject the null that the share
of the variance explained by the random effects is zero, strongly favoring the random effects model over the
pooled model (p<0.001).
14Junta is greater only in Column 4 of Table 4, and Strongman is greater than Machine in Columns 4 and
5 of Table A7.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.144 0.049 0.035 0.203 0.110 0.081
(0.133) (0.117) (0.130) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128)
Machine 0.215 0.287 0.226 0.140 0.060 0.105
(0.195) (0.177) (0.168) (0.189) (0.185) (0.162)
Strongman 0.136 0.165 -0.083 0.259 0.075 -0.050
(0.167) (0.163) (0.161) (0.202) (0.167) (0.199)
Boss 0.485** 0.529*** 0.494*** 0.555*** 0.491** 0.422**
(0.222) (0.182) (0.185) (0.202) (0.192) (0.185)
Monarchy -0.170 -0.364* -0.470** -0.864** -0.975*** -0.937***
(0.183) (0.204) (0.184) (0.424) (0.363) (0.345)
Others -0.188 0.012 -0.361 -0.034 -0.033 -0.325
(0.397) (0.475) (0.361) (0.522) (0.542) (0.402)
Total Borders 0.070*** 0.050*** 0.083*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 0.103***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.031) (0.029) (0.022)
Military Capabilities 5.310** 3.387 2.491 -2.108 -4.747* -4.210
(2.159) (2.091) (2.059) (1.757) (2.441) (2.713)
Number of Allies 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.012* 0.007 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Major Power 0.171 0.309 0.195 1.321*** 1.359*** 0.970**
(0.278) (0.256) (0.265) (0.379) (0.389) (0.395)
Trade Openness 0.022 0.037 0.029 -0.033 -0.023 -0.007
(0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.096) (0.083) (0.072)
Territorial rivalry (strategic) 0.344** 0.715***
(0.154) (0.216)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.578*** 0.440***
(0.172) (0.146)
Strategic rivalry 0.450*** 0.589***
(0.116) (0.141)
KGD rivalry 1.295*** 1.264***
(0.146) (0.158)
Constant -1.271*** -1.791*** -2.814*** -2.065*** -2.519*** -3.272***
(0.204) (0.196) (0.259) (0.378) (0.302) (0.288)
Variance(Country RE) 0.715*** 0.602*** 0.338***
(0.156) (0.126) (0.089)
Test of equality (p-values)
Junta=Machine 0.73 0.25 0.36 0.73 0.79 0.90
Junta=Boss 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07
Strongman=Machine 0.72 0.59 0.16 0.55 0.93 0.47
Strongman=Boss 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.04
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986
Log-Likelihood -2984.9 -2930.9 -2848.0 -2887.5 -2851.3 -2791.5
Table 4. MID Initiation (Side A) in Country-Years. Negative binomial estimates with standard
errors clustered by country (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of
peace years. All regime variables, trade openness, and the number of alliances are lagged by one
year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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territorial MIDs rather than non-territorial MIDs would be responsible for the association,
found in Column 1 of Table 2 and previous studies, between Junta and conflict initiation.
Contrarily, if the military belligerence idea holds true, Junta should be more prone than its
civilian counterpart to initiate militarized disputes in both territorial or non-territorial MIDs.
To test this observable implication, I do not include territorial rivalries and differentiate
between territorial and non-territorial MIDs.
Figure 2 displays the coefficients on authoritarian regimes from pooled logit models
(Panel (a)) and from random effects logit models (Panel (b)). The baseline category is
democracies. Models 1 and 3 probe the initiation of territorial MIDs while Models 2 and 4
investigate the initiation of non-territorial MIDs. Congruent with expectations, Junta (and
Strongman) initiates territorial MIDs at a higher rate than Machine, and the difference is
statistically significant. However, this does not hold true in the context of non-territorial
MIDs. No evidence suggest that military autocracies are more likely to initiate non-territorial
MIDs than civilian autocracies. As the bottom panel of Figure 2 illustrates, a similar pattern
emerges when I estimate a random effects model.
It is also worth noting that the inclusion of territorial rivalries substantially reduces or
removes the difference between Junta and Machine in the models of territorial MIDs (see
Tables A5 and A6). However, the same cannot be said for the models of non-territorial MIDs:
the inclusion of territorial rivalries does not significantly affect the regime coefficients. These
results provide additional evidence that military regimes’ territorial threats are important to
explaining to the relationship between military regimes and international conflict.
These results have a significant implication for the possibility of selection effects: when
a country has weak constraints on the use of violence, the military is more likely to acquire
political power, and it is less likely to settle territorial disputes peacefully.15 This selection
effect may pose a challenge to my argument that external territorial threats promote the
emergence of military regimes as well as increase the likelihood of conflict initiation. However,
15I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility. See also Debs (2016, 7).
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(b) Random Effects Logit
Figure 2. Differences in Coefficients Between Territorial MIDs and Non-Teritorial MIDs
from Logit Regressions. The graph shows the logit regression coefficients from separately
estimated models. Circles show the point estimates, and horizontal line segments associated
with circles show the 95% confidence intervals. All models include full control variables for
dyadic models.
the results illustrated by Figure 2 and reported in Tables A5 and A6 lessen this concern.
If circumstances favoring the use of violence cause both the emergence of military regimes
and their greater likelihood of conflict initiation, we should observe that military regimes are
more likely than civilian regimes to initiate not only territorial MIDs but also non-territorial
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MIDs. Additionally, the inclusion of territorial rivalries should not significantly affect the
relationship between military regimes and territorial MIDs initiations. However, Figure 2
and Tables A5 and A6 demonstrate that this is not true.
Finally, another interesting finding from Figure 2 is that the peacefulness of Monarchy
and Democracy and the belligerence of Boss stand out only in the models of non-territorial
MIDs. Conversely, Junta, Machine, and Strongman differ little from each other in the models
of non-territorial MIDs. This may suggest the need to differentiate between territorial and
non-territorial disputes in analyzing the effect of political regime types on conflict initiation,
confirming the importance of the issue-based approach (Hensel et al. 2008).
Robustness Checks
To ensure the robustness of my results, I perform several additional analyses. Due to space
considerations, the results of these robustness checks are discussed briefly but are available in
the Supporting Appendix unless indicated otherwise.
First, to ensure that the main results are driven by minor or accidental disputes, I use
alternative measures of international conflict: Use of Force MIDs and ICB crises. The use
of alternative MID measures does not alter the key findings (see Tables A8 through A11 for
Use of Force MIDs, and Tables A12 and A13 for ICB crises).
Second, I compare military-led autocracies with civilian-led autocracies, monarchies,
and democracies using Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) regime type data without
accounting for the personalism dimension (see Tables A14 through A17). Recall that the
Cheibub et al. regime classification depends solely on the identity of the regime leader.
Next, I further combine the measure of personalism constructed by Weeks (2012, 2014) with
the Cheibub et al. regime classification to create the four-way dictatorship classification
(see Tables A18 through A21).16 Last, I use the original GWF measures of party-based
regimes and military regimes for Machine and Junta (see Tables A22 through A25). In all
16 However, I do not use Weeks’s classification of autocratic regimes, because Weeks codes about 20% of
all country-years (and 30% of autocratic country-years) as Other Authoritarian. Thus, using the Weeks
regime classification results in the loss of a substantial amount of information. See the Appendix for details.
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cases, monadic and dyadic tests fail to find that military-led autocracies initiate MIDs at a
higher annual rate than civilian-led autocracies. These results indicate that the main results
presented above are not an artifact of my decision to use the GWF data or aggregate all
military hybrids.
Third, I use alternative samples to test the relationship between military dictatorships
and conflict propensity. I restrict the dyad sample to politically relevant dyads that include
at least one major power or two states separated by no more than 24 miles of water (Tables
A28 and A29). Similarly, I include only autocracies for the monadic analysis or autocratic
initiators for the dyadic analysis (Tables A30 and A31). The central findings hold in both
contexts.
Last, I estimate a conditional fixed effects logit model to control for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity between dyads. This estimator allows me to explore the within-unit
(country or directed-dyad) effects of military autocracies. Therefore, if either leaders’ personal
backgrounds or regime attributes are predictors of a military dictatorship’s conflict propensity,
we should be able to find that Argentina becomes more aggressive when transitioning from a
civil to a military dictatorship and not only that Argentina is more aggressive than Mexico. I
find that the fixed effects logit estimates are similar to the random effects logit estimates
reported here (see Tables A32 and A33).
Conclusion
The contribution of this article is two-fold. First, it establishes that military regimes are more
likely to emerge and exist when countries are faced with sustained territorial threats from
neighboring countries. This relationship does not hold for other types of autocracies. Second,
building on this finding, I show that the empirical evidence for the military belligerence
hypothesis is significantly weakened once I control for territorial rivalries. In fact, by capturing
territorial threats, military regimes’ relative aggressiveness disappears. Further analysis
demonstrates that territorial threats from neighboring countries likely drive the relationship
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between military autocracies and increased conflict propensity reported in previous studies.
These findings indicate that military regimes initiate militarized conflicts because they
are located in more hostile security environments, not because they are either institutionally
fragile or predisposed toward using force. These results imply that the military belligerence
hypothesis should be subjected to further examination. As briefly discussed, conflicting
theories and incongruous empirical results mark the literature proposing this hypothesis.
In addition, we know neither which mechanism is responsible for the observed pattern,
nor whether the previous findings are robust, since these studies use different regime-type
datasets that draw on different definitions of military regimes. Future studies should also
examine whether the key assumptions of these previous studies are empirically supported. For
example, does either civilian or military regime leadership predict autocrats’ post-tenure fates
or governing parties’ institutionalization? Questions like these are central to the previous
arguments regarding military regimes’ conflict-proneness.
The argument and findings presented in this article have further implications for future
study. First, future study should explore the relationship between military regimes and
rivalry (particularly territorial rivalry) initiation. In this article, I treat territorial rivalries
as exogenous. However, territorial rivalries may reflect leaders’ purposeful choices in the
sense that military autocrats may initiate rivalries with neighboring countries as a means
of strengthening their political power. Owsiak and Rider (2013) and Rider and Owsiak
(2015) recently examine the onset and termination of contiguous rivalries, but they do not
differentiate among different types of autocracies. Accordingly, it is important to determine
whether military autocracies are more likely to initiate and sustain territorial rivalries than
civilian autocracies.
Second, this article highlights the need for continued research into the relationship
between political regimes and conflict propensity. As previous studies contend, the conflict
propensity of different types of autocracies varies significantly. However, my research departs
from existing studies in that I fail to support military regimes’ belligerence relative to civilian
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regimes. Instead, civilian personalist regimes are the most belligerent of all, which is consistent
with previous studies (Weeks 2008, 2012). Meanwhile, monarchies are found to be the most
peaceful regime type, along with democracies. This may be because monarchies successfully
construct stable ruling coalitions by sharing power via consultative councils (Gandhi 2008)
or by utilizing political culture to enhance cohesion among ruling members (Menaldo 2012).
The relationship between monarchies and international conflict, which (to the best of my
knowledge) has yet to be subjected to a systematic investigation, warrants further research.
Last, future study should further probe the impact of sustained territorial threats
on military regimes. For instance, the effects of territorial rivalries are likely to proceed
and accumulate over time. Thies (2005) argues that interstate rivalries may represent a
slow-moving, causal process that has more of an incremental impact on domestic political
bargaining and political institutions. It is thus possible that the longer a country engages
in territorial rivalries, the greater the military’s capacity to intervene in politics. If so,
I should be able to examine both the short- and long-term effects of territorial rivalries
on domestic politics. However, the binary indicator of whether a country is experiencing
territorial rivalries, adopted in this article, is not well-suited to capturing the long-run effect
of territorial rivalries. I may borrow the empirical strategy used in Gerring, Thacker and
Alfaro (2012). They calculate a “stock” measure of democracy, extending back to 1900 with
several annual depreciation rates to examine the impact of a country’s democratic history on
its level of human development. This strategy would be helpful for investigating the long-term
effect of a country’s history of territorial rivalries on military regimes and domestic politics.
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This document presents the results of statistical models that I conducted but, due to space
constraints, was not able to report in the paper.
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A.1 Models of Authoritarian Regimes
Tables A1 through A4 present the full regression results illustrated in Figure 1.
Regime incidence Regime onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.726*** 1.132***
(0.271) (0.318)
Nonterritorial rivalry (KGD) -0.031 0.133
(0.202) (0.282)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.481** 0.609**
(0.224) (0.283)
Nonterritorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.375 0.254
(0.297) (0.303)
Civil War -0.184 -0.424 -1.797* -1.658*
(0.427) (0.417) (1.028) (0.942)
Democracy -0.569 -0.273 0.768 1.025**
(0.424) (0.420) (0.544) (0.518)
Anocracy 0.253 0.254 1.944*** 1.889***
(0.231) (0.216) (0.376) (0.360)
New/Unstable Regime -0.660** -0.772** -0.109 -0.127
(0.332) (0.320) (0.410) (0.392)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.366*** -0.374*** -0.546***-0.572***
(0.109) (0.102) (0.130) (0.118)
GDP growth 0.005 0.004 -0.029***-0.024**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Post-Cold War -1.040*** -1.092*** -2.192***-2.110***
(0.304) (0.261) (0.597) (0.455)
ln(Time) -0.759*** -0.697*** -0.387** -0.269
(0.182) (0.177) (0.183) (0.182)
Lagged DV 4.885*** 5.127***
(0.522) (0.520)
Constant 0.395 0.192 -0.448 -0.444
(0.929) (0.882) (1.006) (0.904)
Observations 5263 6257 4527 5482
No. countries 145 146 144 145
No. of Y=1 736 773 49 52
Log-Likelihood -413.10 -447.92 -218.71 -245.53
Area under ROC 0.98 0.98 0.87 0.84
Table A1. Logit models of Junta. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are
in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Regime incidence Regime onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) -0.400 0.155
(0.429) (0.520)
Nonterritorial rivalry (KGD) 0.429 0.343
(0.294) (0.447)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.065 -0.061
(0.318) (0.506)
Nonterritorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.561 0.443
(0.347) (0.562)
Civil War 1.433 1.459 1.497** 1.567**
(0.943) (1.030) (0.731) (0.684)
Democracy -0.858* -0.782* 0.228 0.142
(0.461) (0.473) (1.051) (1.036)
Anocracy -0.240 -0.160 0.749 0.772
(0.369) (0.367) (0.658) (0.628)
New/Unstable Regime 0.300 0.169 0.464 0.475
(0.378) (0.391) (0.612) (0.624)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.047 -0.038 -0.377 -0.335
(0.115) (0.113) (0.287) (0.300)
GDP growth 0.036*** 0.038*** -0.023 -0.026*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Post-Cold War -0.420 -0.188 -2.205** -2.512**
(0.325) (0.313) (0.988) (1.022)
ln(Time) -0.808*** -0.930*** -0.741** -0.735**
(0.308) (0.299) (0.318) (0.350)
lnew party 6.843*** 6.745***
(0.832) (0.795)
Constant -3.076*** -3.045*** -1.344 -1.506
(1.085) (1.034) (1.919) (2.035)
Observations 5263 6257 4025 4872
No. countries 145 146 130 132
No. of Y=1 1213 1360 15 15
Log-Likelihood -260.47 -267.57 -82.89 -83.08
Area under ROC 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.88
Table A2. Logit models of Machine. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Regime incidence Regime onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.296 0.101
(0.316) (0.482)
Nonterritorial rivalry (KGD) 0.281 0.398
(0.290) (0.442)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.387 0.197
(0.247) (0.440)
Nonterritorial rivalry (Strategic) -0.180 -0.760
(0.299) (0.635)
Civil War 0.268 0.670 0.536 0.734
(0.691) (0.524) (0.636) (0.625)
Democracy -0.879* -0.519 0.297 0.245
(0.503) (0.395) (0.711) (0.649)
Anocracy -0.026 -0.171 1.049** 1.000**
(0.274) (0.231) (0.441) (0.456)
New/Unstable Regime 0.643* 0.691** 1.180*** 1.168***
(0.331) (0.272) (0.406) (0.393)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.262** -0.225** -0.452** -0.435**
(0.130) (0.099) (0.206) (0.183)
GDP growth 0.004 0.003 -0.011 -0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.021)
Post-Cold War 1.241*** 0.488** 0.429 0.077
(0.311) (0.206) (0.501) (0.456)
lnbossyrs -0.602** -0.478* -0.457* -0.333
(0.255) (0.262) (0.242) (0.240)
Lagged DV 5.577*** 5.709***
(0.840) (0.836)
Constant -2.242* -2.614** -2.024 -2.165
(1.206) (1.084) (1.744) (1.618)
Observations 5263 6257 4917 5820
No. countries 145 146 140 143
No. of Y=1 341 416 26 28
Log-Likelihood -245.29 -313.73 -138.72 -154.24
Area under ROC 0.98 0.98 0.82 0.80
Table A3. Logit models of Boss. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are
in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Regime incidence Regime onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) -0.943*** -0.728
(0.351) (0.750)
Nonterritorial rivalry (KGD) 0.082 -0.246
(0.247) (0.477)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) -0.110 -0.652
(0.257) (0.483)
Nonterritorial rivalry (Strategic) -0.335 -0.602
(0.306) (0.616)
Civil War 0.087 0.322 0.232 0.190
(0.583) (0.638) (0.764) (0.819)
Democracy -0.744 -1.063 -0.050 -0.337
(0.817) (0.774) (0.700) (0.717)
Anocracy -0.575* -0.771*** -0.022 0.005
(0.335) (0.280) (0.518) (0.459)
New/Unstable Regime -0.452 -0.212 0.199 0.167
(0.296) (0.238) (0.427) (0.410)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.558*** -0.515*** -0.833***-0.813***
(0.126) (0.114) (0.171) (0.171)
GDP growth 0.021 0.020 -0.022 -0.022
(0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
Post-Cold War -0.381 -0.403 -0.914 -0.909*
(0.361) (0.257) (0.604) (0.510)
lnstrongyrs -0.606** -0.690*** -0.283 -0.382*
(0.252) (0.217) (0.269) (0.225)
Lagged DV 5.885*** 5.453***
(0.763) (0.659)
Constant 1.078 0.987 1.881 2.138*
(1.109) (0.955) (1.369) (1.244)
Observations 5263 6257 4872 5804
No. countries 145 146 144 145
No. of Y=1 397 450 28 30
Log-Likelihood -233.36 -279.22 -150.00 -161.09
Area under ROC 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.85
Table A4. Logit models of Strongman. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.2 Differentiating Territorial and Non-territorial MIDs
Odd-numbered models of Tables A5 and A6 report the full estimation results when I dif-
ferentiate between territorial and non-territorial MIDs. The results show that the relative
aggressiveness of military dictatorships compared to Machine is found to be statistically
significant only in territorial MIDs. When I examine non-territorial MID initiation, there is
little difference between Machine and military dictatorships. Even-numbered models addi-
tionally include the measures of territorial rivalries. Importantly, the inclusion of territorial
rivalries substantially wipes out the difference between Junta and Machine in the models of
territorial MIDs. However, the same cannot be said for the models of non-territorial MIDs:
the inclusion of territorial rivalries does not significantly affect the regime coefficients.
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Territorial MIDs Non-territorial MIDs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Junta 0.604** 0.286 0.359 0.191 0.602*** 0.622*** 0.297** 0.342**
(0.263) (0.242) (0.221) (0.243) (0.169) (0.186) (0.149) (0.167)
Machine -0.472** 0.056 -0.166 0.249 0.327** 0.367** 0.449*** 0.548***
(0.240) (0.215) (0.253) (0.241) (0.140) (0.147) (0.137) (0.140)
Strongman 0.480* 0.558* 0.380 0.561* 0.494*** 0.634*** 0.263 0.566***
(0.273) (0.294) (0.306) (0.289) (0.191) (0.198) (0.204) (0.197)
Boss 0.242 0.843*** 0.469* 0.993*** 0.910*** 1.061*** 1.140*** 1.361***
(0.299) (0.283) (0.277) (0.284) (0.166) (0.171) (0.175) (0.185)
Monarchy 0.086 -0.088 0.248 0.073 -0.207 -0.180 -1.178*** -0.960***
(0.342) (0.313) (0.366) (0.348) (0.230) (0.245) (0.260) (0.262)
Power Parity -0.319 -0.092 0.015 0.060 0.451*** 0.617*** 0.805*** 0.870***
(0.319) (0.293) (0.345) (0.308) (0.164) (0.168) (0.175) (0.183)
Capabilities, Side A 4.778* 0.858 5.632 4.495 7.691*** 6.915*** 5.845*** 7.184***
(2.480) (4.149) (3.604) (4.350) (2.013) (2.307) (1.799) (1.776)
Capabilities, Side B -0.416 -10.651** 1.160 -5.667 7.628*** 8.207*** 9.795*** 11.076***
(3.164) (4.475) (4.521) (5.027) (1.711) (2.185) (1.657) (1.876)
Major Power A 1.228*** 1.513** 1.980*** 1.429** 0.313 0.286 1.144*** 0.914***
(0.454) (0.648) (0.557) (0.651) (0.323) (0.368) (0.332) (0.318)
Major Power B 1.472*** 2.312*** 2.721*** 2.369*** 0.788** 0.651 1.531*** 1.200***
(0.545) (0.647) (0.622) (0.678) (0.336) (0.416) (0.364) (0.380)
Alliance Similarity -0.186 0.029 0.390 0.302 -1.054*** -0.911*** -0.953*** -0.874***
(0.292) (0.352) (0.409) (0.414) (0.163) (0.173) (0.197) (0.214)
Contiguous Dyad 4.950*** 3.538*** 6.050*** 3.785*** 3.644*** 3.419*** 5.323*** 4.748***
(0.232) (0.326) (0.382) (0.291) (0.137) (0.152) (0.197) (0.207)
Trade Dependence -12.218 8.676 2.670 9.479 -10.587 -1.141 -7.725 1.742
(13.403) (5.724) (7.043) (6.560) (8.717) (7.774) (15.611) (14.232)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 1.309*** 1.904*** 0.372 1.001***
(0.349) (0.347) (0.256) (0.263)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 2.758*** 3.016*** 0.953*** 1.907***
(0.387) (0.349) (0.311) (0.229)
Others 0.331 0.582 0.344 0.659
(0.404) (0.411) (0.393) (0.407)
Constant -6.953*** -8.421***-12.345***-10.601***-6.051*** -6.274*** -10.318*** -10.307***
(0.355) (0.391) (0.788) (0.593) (0.208) (0.229) (0.323) (0.347)
var( cons[dyadid]) 6.875*** 2.171*** 5.627*** 4.968***
(1.203) (0.594) (0.460) (0.459)
Junta=Machine 0.00 0.40 0.06 0.84 0.13 0.20 0.35 0.26
Junta=Boss 0.26 0.10 0.73 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.00 0.12 0.11 0.33 0.37 0.16 0.33 0.93
Strongman=Boss 0.47 0.38 0.82 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00
N 850316 833652 850316 833652 866907 849862 866907 849862
Log-Likelihood -1772.7 -1185.7 -1571.0 -1159.2 -6009.3 -5177.6 -5416.2 -4750.6
Table A5. Differentiating Territorial and Non-territorial MIDs in Directed-Dyads (Side A
initiation). Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses).
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Territorial MIDs Non-territorial MIDs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Junta 0.278 0.004 0.002 -0.060 0.594*** 0.667*** 0.262 0.406**
(0.323) (0.265) (0.297) (0.284) (0.211) (0.230) (0.179) (0.202)
Machine -0.494* -0.205 -0.317 0.141 0.506*** 0.590*** 0.642*** 0.793***
(0.259) (0.224) (0.295) (0.271) (0.152) (0.155) (0.152) (0.155)
Strongman 0.123 0.203 0.072 0.312 0.607*** 0.766*** 0.434* 0.774***
(0.297) (0.283) (0.361) (0.312) (0.205) (0.210) (0.223) (0.229)
Boss 0.263 0.817*** 0.313 1.015*** 1.069*** 1.261*** 1.345*** 1.641***
(0.336) (0.307) (0.381) (0.315) (0.185) (0.194) (0.190) (0.203)
Monarchy -0.112 -0.272 0.095 0.050 -0.357 -0.395 -1.387*** -1.240***
(0.408) (0.371) (0.406) (0.383) (0.314) (0.345) (0.308) (0.336)
Power Parity -0.385 -0.462 -0.065 -0.289 0.634*** 0.822*** 1.083*** 1.136***
(0.362) (0.300) (0.360) (0.313) (0.189) (0.194) (0.199) (0.208)
Capabilities, Side A 3.793 3.906 6.412* 9.641** 7.162*** 6.834*** 4.338** 5.304***
(2.323) (4.169) (3.549) (3.852) (2.239) (2.266) (1.861) (1.928)
Capabilities, Side B -0.285 -9.753* 0.985 -5.963 7.682*** 9.533*** 9.788*** 11.423***
(3.387) (5.449) (4.872) (5.699) (1.920) (2.007) (1.940) (2.047)
Major Power A 1.277*** 1.017 1.657*** 0.576 0.228 0.244 1.193*** 1.049***
(0.467) (0.743) (0.640) (0.713) (0.340) (0.336) (0.355) (0.351)
Major Power B 1.401** 1.628* 2.794*** 2.105** 0.799** 0.615 1.639*** 1.361***
(0.614) (0.861) (0.675) (0.830) (0.377) (0.384) (0.407) (0.418)
Alliance Similarity 0.073 0.329 0.752 0.542 -1.027*** -0.807*** -0.918*** -0.774***
(0.322) (0.371) (0.473) (0.445) (0.187) (0.194) (0.214) (0.236)
Contiguous Dyad 4.973*** 3.712*** 6.159*** 4.064*** 3.513*** 3.369*** 5.256*** 4.933***
(0.263) (0.332) (0.376) (0.284) (0.157) (0.169) (0.226) (0.249)
Trade Dependence -10.717 9.389 7.847 12.384 -4.558 1.197 -1.707 5.420
(16.277) (6.381) (7.029) (7.569) (7.634) (7.522) (14.237) (14.820)
Spatial rivalry (Strategic) 1.211*** 1.675*** 0.864*** 0.847**
(0.386) (0.397) (0.283) (0.368)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 2.943*** 3.278*** -0.564 0.369
(0.414) (0.411) (0.456) (0.446)
Others -0.280 -0.010 -0.053 0.251
(0.512) (0.515) (0.506) (0.517)
Constant -8.501*** -9.337***-13.830***-11.767***-6.396*** -6.739*** -11.187*** -11.301***
(0.377) (0.388) (0.725) (0.645) (0.250) (0.264) (0.390) (0.450)
var( cons[dyadid]) 7.306*** 2.813*** 6.662*** 6.134***
(1.141) (0.704) (0.584) (0.642)
Junta=Machine 0.01 0.47 0.34 0.52 0.69 0.74 0.05 0.07
Junta=Boss 0.97 0.02 0.47 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.04 0.19 0.33 0.61 0.60 0.37 0.33 0.93
Strongman=Boss 0.70 0.07 0.63 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00
N 850316 833652 850316 833652 866907 849862 866907 849862
Log-Likelihood -1683.9 -1113.6 -1454.6 -1078.0 -4842.5 -4129.9 -4324.9 -3779.7
Table A6. Differentiating Territorial and Non-territorial MIDs in Directed-Dyads
(Revisionist initiation). Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported
in parentheses). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.3 Monadic Model of Revisionist Initiations
Table A7 reports the result of monadic tests using a negative binomial model in which the
dependent variable is the number of MID revisionist initiations in a given year. In the main
text, I report only the result of a model in which the dependent variable is the number of
Side A initiations in a given year.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.063 -0.045 -0.052 0.066 -0.035 -0.052
(0.136) (0.125) (0.147) (0.144) (0.141) (0.150)
Machine 0.270 0.350* 0.283* 0.151 0.079 0.111
(0.199) (0.182) (0.172) (0.193) (0.182) (0.159)
Strongman 0.133 0.170 -0.069 0.294 0.116 -0.030
(0.165) (0.162) (0.160) (0.210) (0.184) (0.204)
Boss 0.492** 0.530*** 0.510*** 0.545*** 0.468** 0.406**
(0.227) (0.182) (0.181) (0.211) (0.204) (0.198)
Monarchy -0.230 -0.443* -0.543** -0.833* -0.941** -0.950**
(0.210) (0.239) (0.214) (0.498) (0.414) (0.394)
Others -0.745 -0.579 -0.966** -0.560 -0.548 -0.857*
(0.512) (0.565) (0.460) (0.652) (0.657) (0.509)
Total Borders 0.074*** 0.052** 0.085*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.101***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.032) (0.030) (0.023)
Military Capabilities 3.804* 1.075 0.148 -3.733 -6.781*** -6.249**
(2.264) (2.301) (2.283) (2.352) (2.486) (2.833)
Number of Allies 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Major Power 0.228 0.442 0.332 1.458*** 1.516*** 1.104**
(0.290) (0.279) (0.297) (0.447) (0.473) (0.460)
Trade Openness 0.039 0.045 0.045 -0.004 0.006 0.028
(0.054) (0.047) (0.046) (0.102) (0.086) (0.074)
Territorial rivalry (strategic) 0.396** 0.727***
(0.181) (0.233)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.586*** 0.435***
(0.199) (0.167)
Strategic rivalry 0.482*** 0.604***
(0.124) (0.156)
KGD rivalry 1.326*** 1.295***
(0.162) (0.169)
Constant -1.422*** -1.938*** -2.996*** -2.235*** -2.638*** -3.434***
(0.230) (0.217) (0.283) (0.406) (0.311) (0.307)
Variance(Country RE) 0.757*** 0.589*** 0.349***
(0.189) (0.148) (0.099)
Test of equality (p-values)
Junta=Machine 0.34 0.08 0.15 0.66 0.56 0.42
Junta=Boss 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Strongman=Machine 0.54 0.43 0.12 0.50 0.85 0.52
Strongman=Boss 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.31 0.10 0.08
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986
Log-Likelihood -2504.7 -2456.4 -2388.1 -2428.7 -2397.7 -2345.3
Table A7. MID Initiation (Revisionist) in Country-Years. Negative binomial estimates estimates
with standard errors clustered by country (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic
polynomial of peace years. All regime variables, trade openness, and the number of alliances are
lagged by one year *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.4 Using Alternative Measures of MIDs
To ensure that the main results are driven by minor or accidental disputes, I use alternative
measures of international conflict: Use of Force MIDs and ICB crises. As explained in the
main text, Use of Force MIDs include only those in which force is used. Use of force
equals one if the hostility level of a MID is coded as 4 or 5, and State A is Side A or a
revisionist state in a new dyadic MID against State B. Additionally, the ICB dataset excludes
conflicts resulting from unauthorized or “accidental” uses of force.
Tables A8 to A11 report the results of the dyadic and monadic specifications for Use of
Force MIDs while Tables A12 and A13 present those of the dyadic and monadic specifications
for ICB crises. A pattern similar to that reported in Tables 2 and 3 emerges again. No
significant evidence suggests that Junta and Strongman are more aggressive than Machine
and Boss. Random effects models of Use of Force MIDs show that civilian autocracies are
more aggressive than military autocracies. The results demonstrate that the main results are
not driven by minor or accidental disputes.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.664*** 0.579*** 0.334* 0.348** 0.324** 0.218
(0.189) (0.196) (0.195) (0.160) (0.164) (0.168)
Machine 0.341** 0.361** 0.471*** 0.628*** 0.652*** 0.595***
(0.153) (0.158) (0.133) (0.149) (0.147) (0.137)
Strongman 0.675*** 0.596*** 0.169 0.663*** 0.506** 0.240
(0.203) (0.201) (0.178) (0.221) (0.220) (0.216)
Boss 1.029*** 1.063*** 0.928*** 1.296*** 1.304*** 1.218***
(0.189) (0.183) (0.170) (0.195) (0.192) (0.186)
Monarchy -0.076 -0.128 -0.349 -0.725** -0.732** -0.464
(0.280) (0.249) (0.248) (0.288) (0.286) (0.284)
Others 0.564 0.570 0.157 0.559 0.676 0.236
(0.381) (0.391) (0.358) (0.440) (0.422) (0.394)
Power Parity 0.432** 0.456** 0.484** 0.820*** 0.807*** 0.808***
(0.193) (0.190) (0.203) (0.207) (0.209) (0.201)
Capabilities, Side A 5.175** 4.706 0.287 5.881*** 5.932*** 3.030
(2.526) (3.271) (3.080) (1.938) (2.034) (2.051)
Capabilities, Side B 7.397*** 6.865*** 5.801*** 10.121*** 10.072*** 8.889***
(1.905) (2.600) (2.181) (1.846) (1.994) (2.049)
Major Power A 0.287 0.114 0.112 0.831** 0.680* 0.334
(0.361) (0.496) (0.408) (0.355) (0.369) (0.305)
Major Power B 0.877** 0.872** 0.557 1.715*** 1.612*** 0.921***
(0.346) (0.444) (0.364) (0.387) (0.401) (0.343)
Alliance Similarity -0.761*** -0.729*** -0.212 -0.727*** -0.695*** -0.381*
(0.181) (0.188) (0.177) (0.239) (0.240) (0.209)
Contiguous Dyad 3.863*** 3.573*** 1.930*** 5.426*** 4.903*** 3.012***
(0.145) (0.162) (0.291) (0.203) (0.219) (0.219)
Trade Dependence 0.250 1.941 10.760 9.559 9.665 11.112
(6.945) (5.468) (6.791) (10.585) (10.971) (8.870)
Spatial rivalry (Strategic) 0.817*** 1.241***
(0.206) (0.261)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.019*** 2.347***
(0.277) (0.320)
Strategic rivalry 0.274* 0.968***
(0.152) (0.195)
KGD rivalry 3.910*** 3.554***
(0.291) (0.199)
Constant -6.336*** -6.485*** -7.696*** -10.774*** -10.769*** -9.999***
(0.255) (0.266) (0.278) (0.416) (0.422) (0.369)
var( cons[dyadid]) 5.672*** 5.282*** 2.071***
(0.578) (0.574) (0.321)
Junta=Machine 0.11 0.30 0.53 0.11 0.07 0.03
Junta=Boss 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.87 0.48 0.08
Strongman=Boss 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -4331.4 -4263.6 -3725.7 -3966.8 -3897.8 -3595.1
Table A8. Use of Force MID Initiation (Side A) in Directed-Dyad Years. Logit estimates
with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic
polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.609*** 0.514** 0.252 0.223 0.212 0.120
(0.228) (0.234) (0.227) (0.194) (0.196) (0.205)
Machine 0.409** 0.412** 0.496*** 0.712*** 0.732*** 0.657***
(0.161) (0.163) (0.139) (0.157) (0.156) (0.147)
Strongman 0.740*** 0.645*** 0.228 0.685*** 0.546** 0.273
(0.218) (0.209) (0.193) (0.245) (0.236) (0.237)
Boss 1.110*** 1.110*** 0.955*** 1.331*** 1.335*** 1.232***
(0.204) (0.195) (0.184) (0.210) (0.206) (0.203)
Monarchy -0.073 -0.151 -0.375 -0.710** -0.697** -0.462
(0.327) (0.284) (0.284) (0.350) (0.341) (0.336)
Others -0.001 -0.007 -0.387 -0.078 0.130 -0.213
(0.510) (0.517) (0.503) (0.575) (0.532) (0.502)
Power Parity 0.505** 0.531** 0.529** 0.920*** 0.908*** 0.879***
(0.215) (0.210) (0.222) (0.224) (0.225) (0.219)
Capabilities, Side A 5.514** 5.136 0.640 5.618*** 5.626*** 2.936
(2.721) (3.400) (3.112) (1.959) (2.050) (2.066)
Capabilities, Side B 7.897*** 7.328*** 6.234*** 10.347*** 10.288*** 9.227***
(2.045) (2.757) (2.408) (1.996) (2.146) (2.293)
Major Power A 0.211 0.028 0.019 0.798** 0.662* 0.321
(0.383) (0.509) (0.424) (0.359) (0.372) (0.312)
Major Power B 0.786** 0.808* 0.455 1.667*** 1.563*** 0.856**
(0.365) (0.465) (0.393) (0.413) (0.425) (0.376)
Alliance Similarity -0.758*** -0.712*** -0.183 -0.749*** -0.728*** -0.386*
(0.195) (0.203) (0.188) (0.247) (0.246) (0.218)
Contiguous Dyad 3.784*** 3.493*** 1.775*** 5.309*** 4.792*** 2.891***
(0.160) (0.178) (0.311) (0.215) (0.233) (0.234)
Trade Dependence 3.738 4.105 14.180** 14.059 13.783 14.429*
(6.396) (5.282) (5.928) (9.946) (10.437) (8.576)
Spatial rivalry (Strategic) 0.929*** 1.199***
(0.244) (0.314)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.880*** 2.052***
(0.316) (0.350)
Strategic rivalry 0.273 0.880***
(0.169) (0.228)
KGD rivalry 3.940*** 3.499***
(0.305) (0.221)
Constant -6.504*** -6.614*** -7.715***-11.073***-10.960***-10.103***
(0.286) (0.293) (0.290) (0.458) (0.465) (0.398)
var( cons[dyadid]) 5.991*** 5.483*** 2.231***
(0.659) (0.654) (0.342)
Junta=Machine 0.39 0.68 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.01
Junta=Boss 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.10 0.24 0.16 0.91 0.39 0.09
Strongman=Boss 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -3711.9 -3657.9 -3203.6 -3387.4 -3341.3 -3090.5
Table A9. Use of Force MID Initiation (Revisionist) in Directed-Dyad Years. Logit
estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models
include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.250 0.152 0.131 0.284* 0.221 0.173
(0.156) (0.142) (0.163) (0.160) (0.163) (0.169)
Machine 0.317 0.440** 0.338* 0.376* 0.372* 0.315*
(0.212) (0.196) (0.186) (0.217) (0.198) (0.188)
Strongman 0.233 0.292* 0.013 0.396* 0.256 0.071
(0.187) (0.176) (0.181) (0.238) (0.196) (0.224)
Boss 0.633** 0.688*** 0.621** 0.731*** 0.680*** 0.558**
(0.289) (0.231) (0.249) (0.266) (0.249) (0.247)
Monarchy -0.035 -0.254 -0.350* -0.738* -0.768** -0.763**
(0.206) (0.232) (0.195) (0.420) (0.350) (0.334)
Others 0.152 0.377 -0.025 0.305 0.384 0.066
(0.374) (0.463) (0.325) (0.535) (0.536) (0.402)
Total Borders 0.051** 0.029 0.059*** 0.073** 0.067* 0.073***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.035) (0.034) (0.027)
Military Capabilities 6.446*** 3.563** 2.433 0.818 -1.395 -1.676
(2.088) (1.647) (1.972) (3.240) (2.508) (2.725)
Number of Allies 0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.011 0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Major Power -0.129 0.006 0.009 0.903* 0.783* 0.581
(0.297) (0.244) (0.293) (0.479) (0.414) (0.409)
Trade Openness 0.010 0.016 0.002 -0.014 -0.017 -0.020
(0.058) (0.047) (0.050) (0.085) (0.077) (0.078)
Spatial rivalry 0.303*** 0.530***
(0.114) (0.140)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.796*** 0.689***
(0.154) (0.137)
Strategic rivalry 0.559*** 0.669***
(0.128) (0.138)
KGD rivalry 1.270*** 1.219***
(0.192) (0.188)
Constant -1.498*** -2.129*** -3.041*** -2.498*** -2.851*** -3.490***
(0.232) (0.222) (0.331) (0.332) (0.320) (0.337)
lnalpha 0.104 -0.109 -0.154 -0.565 -0.578 -0.592
(0.405) (0.369) (0.414) (0.360) (0.373) (0.376)
var( cons[cowcode]) 0.781*** 0.511*** 0.292***
(0.222) (0.142) (0.111)
Junta=Machine 0.74 0.20 0.36 0.64 0.43 0.48
Junta=Boss 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.09
Strongman=Machine 0.70 0.52 0.14 0.93 0.53 0.24
Strongman=Boss 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.22 0.06 0.08
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986
Log-Likelihood -2263.6 -2204.9 -2159.0 -2196.2 -2163.9 -2125.8
Table A10. Use of Force MID Initiation (Side A) in Country-Years. Logit estimates with
standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic
polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.162 0.044 0.002 0.147 0.081 0.034
(0.163) (0.153) (0.178) (0.174) (0.171) (0.180)
Machine 0.325 0.448** 0.320* 0.349 0.332* 0.260
(0.218) (0.201) (0.188) (0.214) (0.190) (0.182)
Strongman 0.203 0.245 -0.030 0.370 0.224 0.030
(0.202) (0.179) (0.197) (0.260) (0.209) (0.242)
Boss 0.636** 0.661*** 0.603** 0.696*** 0.630*** 0.526**
(0.289) (0.221) (0.241) (0.267) (0.243) (0.247)
Monarchy -0.108 -0.339 -0.442** -0.715 -0.737** -0.771**
(0.222) (0.249) (0.206) (0.454) (0.363) (0.341)
Others -0.274 -0.075 -0.535 -0.178 -0.085 -0.446
(0.471) (0.547) (0.416) (0.649) (0.627) (0.479)
Total Borders 0.044** 0.020 0.053*** 0.069** 0.057* 0.066**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.035) (0.034) (0.027)
Military Capabilities 5.253*** 2.042 0.998 0.838 -1.200 -1.632
(1.867) (1.677) (2.115) (3.243) (2.295) (2.457)
Number of Allies 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Major Power 0.008 0.179 0.171 0.959** 0.835** 0.622
(0.305) (0.276) (0.339) (0.482) (0.398) (0.405)
Trade Openness 0.019 0.021 0.019 -0.002 -0.002 0.006
(0.058) (0.050) (0.052) (0.088) (0.077) (0.077)
Spatial rivalry 0.337*** 0.545***
(0.125) (0.148)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.805*** 0.645***
(0.167) (0.146)
Strategic rivalry 0.627*** 0.685***
(0.140) (0.153)
KGD rivalry 1.223*** 1.160***
(0.195) (0.190)
Constant -1.547*** -2.165*** -3.086*** -2.555*** -2.820*** -3.475***
(0.267) (0.245) (0.351) (0.357) (0.336) (0.354)
lnalpha 0.300 0.079 0.046 -0.367 -0.372 -0.378
(0.397) (0.352) (0.399) (0.333) (0.346) (0.348)
var( cons[cowcode]) 0.782*** 0.456*** 0.269**
(0.238) (0.139) (0.107)
Junta=Machine 0.46 0.10 0.20 0.34 0.22 0.30
Junta=Boss 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
Strongman=Machine 0.61 0.40 0.15 0.93 0.61 0.33
Strongman=Boss 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.30 0.11 0.11
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986
Log-Likelihood -1940.7 -1888.1 -1851.0 -1884.0 -1857.2 -1825.7
Table A11. Use of Force MID Initiation (Revisionist) in Country-Years. Logit estimates
with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic
polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled Logit Random Effects Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.656** 0.424* 0.288 0.598** 0.451* 0.304
(0.269) (0.238) (0.222) (0.243) (0.233) (0.226)
Machine 0.132 0.220 0.342* 0.478** 0.599*** 0.498***
(0.227) (0.241) (0.187) (0.197) (0.191) (0.183)
Strongman 0.918*** 0.861*** 0.730*** 1.017*** 0.945*** 0.828***
(0.284) (0.261) (0.252) (0.264) (0.261) (0.252)
Boss 0.480* 0.477* 0.426* 0.812*** 0.724*** 0.578**
(0.276) (0.268) (0.233) (0.254) (0.270) (0.249)
Monarchy 0.204 0.041 -0.014 0.203 0.150 0.109
(0.363) (0.342) (0.347) (0.361) (0.358) (0.357)
Others 0.699 0.586 0.709* 1.036** 0.872* 0.762*
(0.439) (0.460) (0.422) (0.419) (0.468) (0.432)
Power parity 0.460 -0.097 -0.722*** 0.604** 0.363 -0.462
(0.288) (0.355) (0.277) (0.260) (0.281) (0.293)
Capabilities, State A 7.067*** 7.106** 4.721* 7.261*** 7.449*** 6.468**
(2.507) (3.071) (2.767) (2.317) (2.459) (2.559)
Capabilities, State B -0.527 -4.337 -6.322 1.653 0.878 -3.811
(4.362) (6.693) (4.263) (3.108) (3.498) (4.130)
Contiguity 3.267*** 2.142*** 0.847*** 3.922*** 2.602*** 1.425***
(0.225) (0.292) (0.270) (0.225) (0.304) (0.317)
Allied dyad 0.361* 0.550** 0.591*** 0.633*** 0.756*** 0.758***
(0.219) (0.216) (0.181) (0.215) (0.224) (0.204)
Spatial Strategic rivalry 0.888*** 1.593***
(0.305) (0.342)
Contiguous KGD rivalry 1.792*** 2.002***
(0.306) (0.297)
Strategic rivalry 1.216*** 1.650***
(0.213) (0.244)
KGD rivalry 3.877*** 3.381***
(0.319) (0.322)
Constant -7.415***-7.607***-8.589***-10.752***-10.720***-10.184***
(0.284) (0.329) (0.248) (0.326) (0.315) (0.320)
var( cons[dirdyadid]) 3.845*** 3.162*** 1.438***
(0.442) (0.412) (0.276)
Junta=Machine 0.05 0.44 0.81 0.63 0.55 0.42
Junta=Boss 0.57 0.85 0.58 0.47 0.37 0.33
Strongman=Machine 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.21
Strongman=Boss 0.17 0.19 0.26 0.48 0.46 0.39
N 919420 919420 919420 919420 919420 919420
Log-Likelihood -2407.7 -2310.2 -2018.3 -2248.1 -2170.4 -1981.8
Table A12. ICB Crisis Initiation in Directed-Dyad Years. Logit estimates with standard
errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include the major power
status of each state in the dyad and a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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Pooled Logit Random Effects Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.632* 0.345 0.325 0.768** 0.492 0.421
(0.372) (0.315) (0.314) (0.368) (0.325) (0.319)
Machine 0.433 0.516* 0.494* 0.749** 0.776*** 0.683**
(0.329) (0.283) (0.279) (0.316) (0.285) (0.280)
Strongman 0.945** 0.772** 0.747* 1.176*** 0.907** 0.873*
(0.402) (0.388) (0.405) (0.396) (0.408) (0.452)
Boss 0.719 0.664 0.665 0.956** 0.845* 0.754*
(0.548) (0.460) (0.445) (0.474) (0.436) (0.432)
Monarchy 0.312 0.008 -0.014 0.263 0.118 0.066
(0.380) (0.342) (0.343) (0.490) (0.408) (0.385)
Others 1.181* 0.903 1.001* 1.293* 0.856 0.870
(0.669) (0.703) (0.584) (0.661) (0.670) (0.604)
Total Borders -0.004 -0.075** -0.011 -0.077 -0.113***-0.060
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.049) (0.043) (0.039)
Military Capabilities 7.415** 5.893** 4.091 7.423 8.559*** 4.219
(2.921) (2.851) (2.648) (5.175) (2.526) (3.212)
Number of Allies 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.008 0.012
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Major Power 0.551 1.011** 0.539 1.469** 1.466*** 1.009**
(0.411) (0.508) (0.417) (0.582) (0.515) (0.515)
Trade Openness 0.137 0.163* 0.142 0.138 0.150 0.131
(0.098) (0.093) (0.094) (0.130) (0.114) (0.109)
Spatial rivalry 0.294 0.400
(0.221) (0.264)
Contiguous rivalry 1.091*** 1.156***
(0.196) (0.224)
Strategic rivalry 0.974*** 1.009***
(0.232) (0.264)
KGD rivalry 1.193*** 1.186***
(0.250) (0.267)
Constant -3.091***-3.860***-4.828***-4.140***-4.756***-5.353***
(0.430) (0.456) (0.462) (0.501) (0.488) (0.511)
var( cons[cowcode]) 1.015*** 0.672*** 0.446***
(0.315) (0.178) (0.124)
Junta=Machine 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.95 0.35 0.38
Junta=Boss 0.87 0.47 0.42 0.68 0.41 0.42
Strongman=Machine 0.11 0.44 0.49 0.22 0.72 0.67
Strongman=Boss 0.68 0.83 0.87 0.65 0.90 0.82
N 5976 5976 5976 5976 5976 5976
Log-Likelihood -1133.9 -1100.2 -1076.5 -1108.1 -1082.4 -1066.5
Table A13. ICB Crisis Initiation in Country-Years. Negative binomial estimates with
standard errors clustered by country (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic
polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.5 Using Alternative Measures of Political Regimes
Here I compare military with civilian autocracies, monarchies, and democracies using Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland’s (2010) regime type data. As stated previously, the Cheibub et al.
regime classification depends solely on the identity of the regime leader. An autocratic
country-year is coded as a military dictatorship if the regime leader is not a monarch and is
a current or former member of the armed forces, and as a civilian dictatorship if the leader
qualifies neither as a monarch nor as a military ruler. I estimate the same set of models in
Tables ?? and ?? and set military dictatorship as the baseline category. Results are available
in Tables A14 to A17. If the military belligerence theory is correct, I should find negative
coefficient estimates on civilian-led autocracies. This should apply even to Weeks’ argument,
since Machine and Boss constitute civilian-led autocracies, and Junta and Strongman belong
to military-led autocracies.
Next, I further combine the measure of personalism constructed by Weeks (2012, 2014)
with the Cheibub et al. regime classification to create the four-way dictatorship classification.
To measure personalism, Weeks relies on Geddes’s data on authoritarian regimes. Colgan and
Weeks (2015) update the Weeks’s personalism measure to fill in missing data where possible,
based on their own research and the Geddes et al. dataset. I use the measure of personalism
taken from Colgan and Weeks (2015).
I choose this classification over the Weeks (2012, 2014) classification of autocratic regimes,
because Weeks codes about 20% of all country-years (and 30% of autocratic country-years)
as Other Authoritarian. Accordingly, using the Weeks regime classification will result in
the loss of a substantial amount of information. In addition, Weeks (2014) finds that Other
Authoritarian is as conflict-prone as Junta and Strongman (44). This is puzzling given that
the half of Other observations are coded as democracies and monarchies, the most peaceful
regime types, 40% of them civilian autocracies, and only 10% of them military autocracies in
the Cheibub et al. and Geddes et al. datasets. If Weeks’s argument is correct, Other type
should be less likely to initiate militarized disputes than military regimes. Therefore, I use
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only the measure of personalism from the Weeks data. Tables A18 through A21 present the
estimation results.
Last, to ensure that the central findings are not simply an artifact of my decision to
aggregate all military hybrids, I use the original GWF measures of military and party-based
regimes for Junta and Machine and re-estimate all the dyadic and monadic models. The
results are reported in Tables A22 through A25.
Regardless of whether I use only the Cheibub et al. regime classification, combine it with
the Weeks personalism, or rely on the original GWF measures of military and party-based
regimes, I fail to find that military autocracies initiate MIDs at a higher annual rate than
civilian autocracies. These results indicate that the main results are robust to alternative
regime data.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy -0.675*** -0.659*** -0.328*** -0.459*** -0.419*** -0.271**
(0.130) (0.131) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Civilian -0.270** -0.167 0.167 0.300** 0.365*** 0.421***
(0.121) (0.129) (0.127) (0.123) (0.121) (0.116)
Monarchy -0.835*** -0.786*** -0.687*** -1.117*** -1.101*** -0.748***
(0.222) (0.217) (0.209) (0.211) (0.212) (0.212)
Power Parity 0.625*** 0.681*** 0.729*** 0.968*** 0.992*** 0.960***
(0.147) (0.144) (0.153) (0.158) (0.159) (0.150)
Capabilities, Side A 6.400*** 6.065** 2.592 5.837*** 5.731*** 4.767***
(2.015) (2.521) (2.394) (1.799) (1.819) (1.596)
Capabilities, Side B 7.317*** 6.612** 5.763** 10.277***10.215*** 9.118***
(1.898) (2.959) (2.370) (1.740) (1.891) (1.912)
Major Power A 0.378 0.286 0.202 1.214*** 1.060*** 0.502**
(0.327) (0.423) (0.346) (0.300) (0.302) (0.241)
Major Power B 0.822** 0.839* 0.474 1.492*** 1.370*** 0.766**
(0.332) (0.483) (0.362) (0.348) (0.356) (0.313)
Alliance Similarity -0.828*** -0.803*** -0.297* -0.747*** -0.722*** -0.458**
(0.153) (0.161) (0.158) (0.202) (0.206) (0.181)
Contiguous Dyad 3.821*** 3.462*** 1.934*** 5.376*** 4.790*** 3.112***
(0.130) (0.150) (0.237) (0.213) (0.225) (0.218)
Trade Dependence 0.682 3.718 10.770* 8.532 8.334 9.545
(5.917) (4.989) (6.157) (7.502) (7.986) (7.123)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.678*** 1.294***
(0.206) (0.230)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.440*** 2.326***
(0.235) (0.211)
Strategic rivalry 0.398*** 1.090***
(0.140) (0.163)
KGD rivalry 3.977*** 3.616***
(0.235) (0.167)
Constant -5.343*** -5.651*** -7.365*** -9.703*** -9.793*** -9.496***
(0.244) (0.269) (0.270) (0.373) (0.355) (0.305)
var( cons[dyadid]) 4.958*** 4.457*** 1.855***
(0.472) (0.434) (0.265)
N 976306 976306 976306 976306 976306 976306
Log-Likelihood -6124.0 -5986.9 -5258.7 -5599.8 -5485.5 -5085.7
Table A14. Using the Cheibut et al. Regime Type Data (dyadic). The dependent variable
is Side A initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in
parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy -0.702*** -0.684*** -0.345*** -0.451*** -0.431*** -0.285**
(0.151) (0.147) (0.134) (0.136) (0.135) (0.137)
Civilian -0.190 -0.100 0.240* 0.401*** 0.459*** 0.512***
(0.136) (0.143) (0.136) (0.139) (0.136) (0.131)
Monarchy -0.979*** -0.941*** -0.844*** -1.301*** -1.277*** -0.907***
(0.292) (0.280) (0.278) (0.266) (0.263) (0.270)
Power Parity 0.702*** 0.757*** 0.772*** 1.125*** 1.138*** 1.053***
(0.170) (0.165) (0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.171)
Capabilities, Side A 6.211*** 5.965** 2.124 4.601** 4.578** 3.928**
(2.164) (2.683) (2.390) (1.993) (2.005) (1.712)
Capabilities, Side B 7.127*** 6.083* 5.640** 9.920*** 9.732*** 8.505***
(2.106) (3.245) (2.602) (1.922) (2.095) (2.251)
Major Power A 0.231 0.109 0.063 1.095*** 0.967*** 0.378
(0.346) (0.443) (0.353) (0.337) (0.339) (0.263)
Major Power B 0.857** 0.934* 0.477 1.692*** 1.605*** 0.918***
(0.355) (0.498) (0.387) (0.373) (0.381) (0.345)
Alliance Similarity -0.697*** -0.637*** -0.121 -0.545** -0.516** -0.248
(0.174) (0.182) (0.172) (0.226) (0.229) (0.201)
Contiguous Dyad 3.791*** 3.433*** 1.733*** 5.383*** 4.836*** 2.947***
(0.147) (0.167) (0.265) (0.252) (0.266) (0.247)
Trade Dependence 2.453 4.164 13.916** 10.881 9.844 11.460
(5.918) (5.129) (5.626) (7.435) (8.033) (7.139)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.856*** 1.127***
(0.245) (0.275)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.236*** 2.148***
(0.270) (0.259)
Strategic rivalry 0.392** 0.979***
(0.154) (0.190)
KGD rivalry 4.053*** 3.635***
(0.258) (0.191)
Constant -5.663*** -5.926*** -7.515***-10.484***-10.459***-9.856***
(0.289) (0.306) (0.286) (0.451) (0.428) (0.350)
var( cons[dyadid]) 5.702*** 5.165*** 2.106***
(0.613) (0.571) (0.310)
N 976306 976306 976306 976306 976306 976306
Log-Likelihood -5022.1 -4920.5 -4299.8 -4565.0 -4494.6 -4153.2
Table A15. Using the Cheibut et al. Regime Type Data (dyadic). The dependent variable
is Revisionist initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in
parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy -0.260** -0.209* -0.085 -0.213 -0.108 -0.093
(0.128) (0.112) (0.120) (0.142) (0.131) (0.137)
Civilian 0.034 0.120 0.213 0.156 0.203 0.181
(0.160) (0.162) (0.170) (0.143) (0.125) (0.139)
Monarchy -0.510** -0.624*** -0.581*** -1.305*** -1.268*** -1.194***
(0.213) (0.236) (0.201) (0.316) (0.269) (0.303)
Total Borders 0.089*** 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.121***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.032) (0.030) (0.023)
Military Capabilities 4.620* 2.748 1.751 -3.977** -6.877** -6.000**
(2.505) (2.498) (2.326) (1.603) (2.876) (2.889)
Number of Allies 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.014** 0.010 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Major Power 0.202 0.339 0.264 1.716*** 1.698*** 1.264***
(0.313) (0.278) (0.293) (0.355) (0.386) (0.406)
Trade Openness 0.005 0.027 0.010 -0.053 -0.041 -0.033
(0.047) (0.043) (0.049) (0.079) (0.068) (0.066)
Spatial rivalry 0.333** 0.707***
(0.164) (0.217)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.603*** 0.496***
(0.178) (0.149)
Strategic rivalry 0.438*** 0.556***
(0.132) (0.137)
KGD rivalry 1.355*** 1.343***
(0.137) (0.150)
Constant -1.119*** -1.686*** -2.779*** -2.207*** -2.734*** -3.385***
(0.157) (0.218) (0.316) (0.337) (0.277) (0.314)
lnalpha 0.137 0.011 -0.131 -0.487 -0.536 -0.624*
(0.330) (0.335) (0.315) (0.369) (0.343) (0.323)
var( cons[cowcode]) 0.907*** 0.744*** 0.426***
(0.170) (0.132) (0.096)
N 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792
Log-Likelihood -3048.3 -2991.2 -2894.4 -2926.2 -2888.8 -2821.9
Table A16. Using the Cheibut et al Regime Type Data (monadic). The dependent variable
is Side A initiation.Negative binomial estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad
(reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy -0.210 -0.155 -0.018 -0.099 0.014 0.038
(0.129) (0.119) (0.124) (0.148) (0.129) (0.140)
Civilian 0.086 0.168 0.279 0.173 0.213 0.208
(0.174) (0.178) (0.186) (0.159) (0.144) (0.152)
Monarchy -0.565** -0.682** -0.629*** -1.325*** -1.273*** -1.211***
(0.253) (0.282) (0.238) (0.417) (0.353) (0.378)
Total Borders 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.089*** 0.135*** 0.129*** 0.119***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.035) (0.032) (0.025)
Military Capabilities 3.142 0.478 -0.647 -6.238*** -9.776*** -8.822***
(2.630) (2.680) (2.482) (1.432) (2.082) (2.451)
Number of Allies 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Major Power 0.266 0.492* 0.416 1.906*** 1.924*** 1.452***
(0.325) (0.297) (0.324) (0.429) (0.477) (0.479)
Trade Openness 0.020 0.039 0.028 -0.030 -0.018 -0.002
(0.050) (0.047) (0.054) (0.088) (0.076) (0.075)
Spatial rivalry 0.396** 0.756***
(0.195) (0.241)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.602*** 0.491***
(0.208) (0.172)
Strategic rivalry 0.479*** 0.601***
(0.139) (0.156)
KGD rivalry 1.399*** 1.396***
(0.152) (0.165)
Constant -1.304*** -1.872*** -3.022*** -2.448*** -2.945*** -3.657***
(0.185) (0.250) (0.357) (0.393) (0.311) (0.361)
lnalpha 0.429 0.301 0.158 -0.175 -0.233 -0.327
(0.323) (0.330) (0.301) (0.346) (0.319) (0.299)
var( cons[cowcode]) 1.006*** 0.785*** 0.469***
(0.224) (0.167) (0.114)
N 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792
Log-Likelihood -2555.4 -2504.4 -2422.1 -2459.2 -2426.1 -2366.2
Table A17. Using the Cheibut et al Regime Type Data (monadic). The dependent variable
is Revisionist initiation.Negative binomial estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad
(reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Machine 0.039 0.126 0.126 0.232* 0.238* 0.166
(0.140) (0.144) (0.122) (0.135) (0.132) (0.118)
Boss 0.852*** 0.941*** 0.872*** 1.313*** 1.360*** 1.233***
(0.142) (0.150) (0.133) (0.145) (0.147) (0.136)
Strongman 0.745*** 0.740*** 0.346*** 0.614*** 0.569*** 0.371***
(0.138) (0.140) (0.124) (0.138) (0.134) (0.132)
Junta 0.363** 0.371** 0.203 0.194 0.156 0.100
(0.183) (0.180) (0.172) (0.161) (0.167) (0.168)
Monarchy -0.185 -0.152 -0.352* -0.556** -0.587*** -0.409*
(0.228) (0.220) (0.207) (0.221) (0.219) (0.215)
Power Parity 0.462*** 0.529*** 0.589*** 0.787*** 0.826*** 0.825***
(0.154) (0.153) (0.162) (0.166) (0.167) (0.159)
Capabilities, Side A 7.541*** 7.195*** 4.223* 7.754*** 7.634*** 6.916***
(2.016) (2.497) (2.382) (1.810) (1.856) (1.642)
Capabilities, Side B 7.040*** 6.290** 5.385** 10.176***10.144*** 8.929***
(1.907) (3.006) (2.436) (1.781) (1.938) (1.973)
Major Power A 0.166 0.087 -0.015 0.999*** 0.854*** 0.254
(0.336) (0.430) (0.352) (0.311) (0.316) (0.257)
Major Power B 0.807** 0.841* 0.455 1.457*** 1.343*** 0.747**
(0.335) (0.481) (0.360) (0.351) (0.359) (0.315)
Alliance Similarity -0.808*** -0.798*** -0.290* -0.699*** -0.689*** -0.420**
(0.154) (0.163) (0.161) (0.204) (0.207) (0.184)
Contiguous Dyad 3.722*** 3.380*** 1.891*** 5.225*** 4.671*** 3.053***
(0.132) (0.151) (0.234) (0.208) (0.220) (0.216)
Trade Dependence 1.380 5.123 11.326* 9.388 9.025 10.829
(6.162) (4.983) (6.287) (7.197) (7.403) (6.822)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.624*** 1.381***
(0.218) (0.223)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.452*** 2.366***
(0.246) (0.208)
Strategic rivalry 0.369** 1.092***
(0.143) (0.172)
KGD rivalry 3.936*** 3.619***
(0.229) (0.164)
Constant -5.782*** -6.093*** -7.533*** -9.899***-10.036***-9.693***
(0.198) (0.232) (0.237) (0.355) (0.338) (0.304)
var( cons[dyadid]) 4.710*** 4.325*** 1.824***
(0.450) (0.418) (0.259)
Junta=Machine 0.09 0.20 0.69 0.83 0.65 0.70
Junta=Boss 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.14
Strongman=Boss 0.46 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 871245 871245 871245 871245 871245 871245
Log-Likelihood -5946.0 -5816.1 -5115.3 -5454.9 -5336.5 -4944.0
Table A18. Combining the Cheibub et al. Regime Type Data and Weeks’ Personalism
(dyadic). The dependent variable is Side A initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors
clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace
years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Machine 0.074 0.147 0.148 0.231 0.249* 0.206
(0.158) (0.154) (0.134) (0.153) (0.150) (0.135)
Boss 1.034*** 1.106*** 1.012*** 1.476*** 1.531*** 1.372***
(0.157) (0.157) (0.143) (0.158) (0.161) (0.151)
Strongman 0.777*** 0.758*** 0.355** 0.576*** 0.559*** 0.364**
(0.159) (0.155) (0.140) (0.156) (0.151) (0.150)
Junta 0.417** 0.443** 0.260 0.295 0.266 0.197
(0.209) (0.205) (0.191) (0.183) (0.189) (0.188)
Monarchy -0.310 -0.291 -0.502* -0.783*** -0.797*** -0.591**
(0.312) (0.296) (0.294) (0.297) (0.293) (0.294)
Power Parity 0.562*** 0.619*** 0.644*** 0.967*** 0.991*** 0.932***
(0.180) (0.176) (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) (0.181)
Capabilities, Side A 7.551*** 7.337*** 4.068* 7.147*** 7.009*** 6.495***
(2.180) (2.679) (2.420) (2.021) (2.056) (1.758)
Capabilities, Side B 6.996*** 5.849* 5.339** 9.904*** 9.723*** 8.407***
(2.122) (3.312) (2.684) (1.987) (2.161) (2.310)
Major Power A -0.014 -0.123 -0.193 0.829** 0.718** 0.095
(0.356) (0.453) (0.361) (0.351) (0.356) (0.280)
Major Power B 0.836** 0.933* 0.453 1.658*** 1.581*** 0.895***
(0.359) (0.499) (0.384) (0.380) (0.387) (0.346)
Alliance Similarity -0.687*** -0.641*** -0.116 -0.503** -0.489** -0.203
(0.176) (0.186) (0.176) (0.228) (0.231) (0.204)
Contiguous Dyad 3.687*** 3.341*** 1.683*** 5.171*** 4.662*** 2.851***
(0.150) (0.170) (0.260) (0.240) (0.252) (0.242)
Trade Dependence 3.787 6.281 14.757***12.314* 11.110 13.323**
(6.129) (5.028) (5.617) (7.088) (7.267) (6.729)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.806*** 1.203***
(0.263) (0.279)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.247*** 2.207***
(0.288) (0.258)
Strategic rivalry 0.364** 0.966***
(0.159) (0.200)
KGD rivalry 4.005*** 3.622***
(0.249) (0.189)
Constant -6.147*** -6.399*** -7.702***-10.640***-10.677***-10.032***
(0.241) (0.262) (0.250) (0.419) (0.400) (0.353)
var( cons[dyadid]) 5.342*** 4.950*** 2.023***
(0.563) (0.526) (0.296)
Junta=Machine 0.12 0.18 0.60 0.76 0.94 0.96
Junta=Boss 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.33
Strongman=Boss 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 871245 871245 871245 871245 871245 871245
Log-Likelihood -4857.5 -4762.7 -4166.1 -4427.9 -4354.0 -4023.8
Table A19. Combining the Cheibub et al. Regime Type Data and Weeks’ Personalism
(dyadic). The dependent variable is Revisionist initiation. Logit estimates with standard
errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of
peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.027 0.034 -0.051 0.112 0.032 0.045
(0.169) (0.140) (0.159) (0.159) (0.157) (0.150)
Machine -0.131 -0.047 -0.063 -0.158 -0.179 -0.126
(0.149) (0.148) (0.122) (0.224) (0.216) (0.162)
Strongman 0.316** 0.273** 0.163 0.281* 0.198 0.193
(0.135) (0.125) (0.127) (0.167) (0.149) (0.164)
Boss 0.685*** 0.715*** 0.671*** 0.747*** 0.707*** 0.639***
(0.238) (0.209) (0.207) (0.238) (0.216) (0.202)
Total Borders 0.083*** 0.068*** 0.092*** 0.126*** 0.129*** 0.127***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.034) (0.031) (0.024)
Military Capabilities 5.808*** 4.160** 3.314* -1.212 -3.605** -3.237
(1.947) (1.715) (1.772) (1.569) (1.675) (1.981)
Number of Allies 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.013* 0.008 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Major Power 0.159 0.240 0.163 1.446*** 1.426*** 1.083***
(0.299) (0.280) (0.283) (0.365) (0.379) (0.375)
Trade Openness 0.027 0.060 0.052 -0.040 -0.010 0.017
(0.062) (0.053) (0.057) (0.095) (0.082) (0.081)
Spatial rivalry 0.251* 0.607***
(0.151) (0.182)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.607*** 0.473***
(0.166) (0.134)
Strategic rivalry 0.385*** 0.480***
(0.126) (0.128)
KGD rivalry 1.312*** 1.301***
(0.147) (0.158)
Constant -1.396*** -1.931*** -2.945*** -2.339*** -2.814*** -3.581***
(0.220) (0.214) (0.301) (0.373) (0.342) (0.371)
lnalpha 0.047 -0.066 -0.191 -0.608* -0.662** -0.718**
(0.304) (0.318) (0.295) (0.339) (0.324) (0.311)
var( cons[cowcode]) 0.787*** 0.679*** 0.414***
(0.159) (0.150) (0.101)
Junta=Machine 0.36 0.64 0.94 0.23 0.33 0.34
Junta=Boss 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07
Strongman=Boss 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02
N 5631 5631 5631 5631 5631 5631
Log-Likelihood -2747.3 -2702.3 -2625.0 -2647.5 -2619.3 -2562.8
Table A20. Combining the Cheibut et al. Regime Type Data and Weeks’ Personalism
(monadic). The dependent variable is Side A initiation. Negative binomial estimates with
standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic
polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta -0.028 -0.010 -0.099 0.059 -0.039 -0.018
(0.155) (0.122) (0.142) (0.165) (0.147) (0.142)
Machine -0.217 -0.128 -0.136 -0.355 -0.367 -0.289
(0.165) (0.179) (0.140) (0.258) (0.249) (0.189)
Strongman 0.259* 0.209 0.085 0.127 0.047 0.028
(0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.175) (0.158) (0.174)
Boss 0.731*** 0.751*** 0.703*** 0.702*** 0.639*** 0.564***
(0.245) (0.214) (0.209) (0.255) (0.227) (0.215)
Total Borders 0.092*** 0.075*** 0.099*** 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.133***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.037) (0.033) (0.026)
Military Capabilities 4.907*** 2.578 1.578 -2.285 -5.321*** -5.130**
(1.866) (1.658) (1.852) (2.555) (1.815) (2.269)
Number of Allies 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Major Power 0.181 0.335 0.264 1.570*** 1.599*** 1.219***
(0.298) (0.287) (0.302) (0.450) (0.467) (0.458)
Trade Openness 0.060 0.091 0.090 0.013 0.044 0.075
(0.065) (0.057) (0.060) (0.108) (0.092) (0.088)
Spatial rivalry 0.302* 0.654***
(0.172) (0.203)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.594*** 0.438***
(0.189) (0.154)
Strategic rivalry 0.426*** 0.519***
(0.134) (0.151)
KGD rivalry 1.338*** 1.334***
(0.164) (0.173)
Constant -1.595*** -2.123*** -3.187*** -2.621*** -3.057*** -3.848***
(0.243) (0.246) (0.339) (0.423) (0.375) (0.413)
lnalpha 0.311 0.196 0.074 -0.312 -0.371 -0.429
(0.288) (0.305) (0.276) (0.305) (0.290) (0.283)
var( cons[cowcode]) 0.897*** 0.752*** 0.465***
(0.201) (0.191) (0.118)
Junta=Machine 0.31 0.55 0.84 0.12 0.19 0.19
Junta=Boss 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Strongman=Machine 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.15
Strongman=Boss 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
N 5631 5631 5631 5631 5631 5631
Log-Likelihood -2299.7 -2261.2 -2196.8 -2221.7 -2198.1 -2149.3
Table A21. Combining the Cheibut et al. Regime Type Data and Weeks’ Personalism
(monadic). The dependent variable is Revisionist initiation. Negative binomial estimates
with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic
polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.509** 0.509** 0.383* 0.256* 0.185 0.157
(0.204) (0.204) (0.199) (0.152) (0.153) (0.158)
Party 0.330** 0.330** 0.281*** 0.429*** 0.465*** 0.374***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.108) (0.123) (0.123) (0.111)
Strongman 0.609*** 0.609*** 0.117 0.570*** 0.500*** 0.191
(0.169) (0.169) (0.144) (0.177) (0.169) (0.173)
Boss 1.006*** 1.006*** 0.875*** 1.202*** 1.214*** 1.160***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.152) (0.167) (0.167) (0.156)
Monarchy -0.160 -0.160 -0.411** -0.720*** -0.757*** -0.533**
(0.204) (0.204) (0.191) (0.227) (0.225) (0.217)
Others 0.323 0.323 -0.116 0.214 0.330 -0.171
(0.415) (0.415) (0.359) (0.418) (0.418) (0.370)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.701*** 0.701*** 1.444***
(0.207) (0.207) (0.219)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.445*** 1.445*** 2.336***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.205)
Power Parity 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.509*** 0.719*** 0.752*** 0.737***
(0.155) (0.155) (0.163) (0.166) (0.166) (0.157)
Capabilities, Side A 6.613*** 6.613*** 3.631 6.947*** 6.800*** 5.922***
(2.521) (2.521) (2.349) (1.750) (1.784) (1.552)
Capabilities, Side B 6.236** 6.236** 5.146** 9.616*** 9.533*** 8.346***
(2.871) (2.871) (2.231) (1.712) (1.859) (1.844)
Major Power A 0.309 0.309 0.227 1.152*** 1.001*** 0.473*
(0.426) (0.426) (0.343) (0.301) (0.303) (0.241)
Major Power B 0.851* 0.851* 0.504 1.534*** 1.412*** 0.795***
(0.470) (0.470) (0.338) (0.346) (0.352) (0.300)
Alliance Similarity -0.751*** -0.751*** -0.235 -0.680*** -0.664*** -0.372**
(0.160) (0.160) (0.156) (0.198) (0.201) (0.178)
Contiguous Dyad 3.374*** 3.374*** 1.914*** 5.192*** 4.602*** 3.001***
(0.148) (0.148) (0.228) (0.205) (0.216) (0.205)
Trade Dependence 1.936 1.936 8.284 6.332 6.473 8.278
(5.183) (5.183) (6.844) (7.747) (7.974) (6.942)
Strategic rivalry 0.395*** 1.076***
(0.138) (0.161)
KGD rivalry 3.893*** 3.578***
(0.220) (0.163)
Constant -6.117*** -6.117*** -7.464*** -9.755*** -9.839*** -9.449***
(0.227) (0.227) (0.230) (0.341) (0.326) (0.286)
var( cons[dyadid]) 4.703*** 4.236*** 1.719***
(0.445) (0.415) (0.244)
Junta=Machine 0.41 0.63 0.29 0.09 0.19
Junta=Boss 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.08 0.25 0.40 0.83 0.28
Strongman=Boss 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -5944.9 -5944.9 -5224.1 -5585.2 -5462.7 -5062.8
Table A22. Using Original GWF Measures of Party-Based and Military Regimes (dyadic).
The dependent variable is Side A initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered
by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.568** 0.497** 0.334 0.202 0.160 0.126
(0.240) (0.249) (0.239) (0.191) (0.191) (0.201)
Party 0.405*** 0.464*** 0.415*** 0.598*** 0.633*** 0.542***
(0.139) (0.138) (0.115) (0.137) (0.136) (0.124)
Strongman 0.746*** 0.728*** 0.254 0.734*** 0.675*** 0.362**
(0.176) (0.172) (0.155) (0.196) (0.184) (0.184)
Boss 1.093*** 1.146*** 0.994*** 1.393*** 1.398*** 1.299***
(0.173) (0.166) (0.165) (0.180) (0.182) (0.172)
Monarchy -0.198 -0.245 -0.507* -0.821*** -0.838*** -0.611**
(0.297) (0.264) (0.263) (0.297) (0.291) (0.288)
Others -0.404 -0.332 -0.726 -0.368 -0.168 -0.560
(0.512) (0.518) (0.507) (0.553) (0.522) (0.502)
Power Parity 0.531*** 0.579*** 0.569*** 0.900*** 0.919*** 0.852***
(0.179) (0.174) (0.186) (0.185) (0.185) (0.179)
Capabilities, Side A 6.684*** 6.497** 3.084 5.897*** 5.799*** 5.098***
(2.170) (2.699) (2.391) (1.943) (1.967) (1.679)
Capabilities, Side B 6.781*** 5.695* 5.102** 9.270*** 9.066*** 7.753***
(2.046) (3.188) (2.511) (1.907) (2.076) (2.173)
Major Power A 0.266 0.140 0.107 1.038*** 0.910*** 0.365
(0.347) (0.446) (0.354) (0.338) (0.340) (0.264)
Major Power B 0.863** 0.943* 0.509 1.735*** 1.642*** 0.944***
(0.348) (0.488) (0.367) (0.371) (0.377) (0.331)
Alliance Similarity -0.657*** -0.607*** -0.080 -0.501** -0.482** -0.193
(0.173) (0.180) (0.170) (0.220) (0.222) (0.196)
Contiguous Dyad 3.707*** 3.344*** 1.747*** 5.191*** 4.633*** 2.850***
(0.144) (0.164) (0.254) (0.240) (0.251) (0.233)
Trade Dependence 0.756 3.178 11.934** 9.333 8.496 10.775
(6.400) (5.169) (5.907) (7.435) (7.803) (6.702)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.887*** 1.292***
(0.244) (0.258)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.227*** 2.109***
(0.271) (0.251)
Strategic rivalry 0.381** 0.961***
(0.151) (0.186)
KGD rivalry 3.936*** 3.551***
(0.242) (0.188)
Constant -6.192*** -6.430*** -7.642***-10.544***-10.493***-9.791***
(0.235) (0.255) (0.246) (0.417) (0.399) (0.336)
var( cons[dyadid]) 5.362*** 4.830*** 1.905***
(0.574) (0.536) (0.287)
Junta=Machine 0.50 0.90 0.74 0.04 0.02 0.04
Junta=Boss 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.03 0.10 0.28 0.46 0.81 0.30
Strongman=Boss 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -4992.2 -4886.1 -4280.3 -4554.3 -4480.4 -4147.3
Table A23. Using Original GWF Measures of Party-Based and Military Regimes (dyadic).
The dependent variable is Revisionist initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered
by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.158 0.091 0.091 0.228* 0.112 0.102
(0.142) (0.134) (0.145) (0.131) (0.132) (0.130)
Party 0.198 0.228 0.169 0.128 0.066 0.086
(0.172) (0.151) (0.144) (0.171) (0.168) (0.146)
Strongman 0.137 0.164 -0.082 0.254 0.075 -0.053
(0.166) (0.162) (0.160) (0.201) (0.167) (0.199)
Boss 0.485** 0.526*** 0.492*** 0.549*** 0.490** 0.419**
(0.222) (0.185) (0.187) (0.202) (0.194) (0.186)
Monarchy -0.170 -0.363* -0.470** -0.871** -0.973*** -0.946***
(0.183) (0.204) (0.185) (0.427) (0.362) (0.349)
Others -0.189 0.005 -0.364 -0.038 -0.032 -0.330
(0.397) (0.472) (0.360) (0.522) (0.543) (0.402)
Total Borders 0.070*** 0.051*** 0.084*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 0.103***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.031) (0.029) (0.022)
Military Capabilities 5.382** 3.667* 2.734 -2.081 -4.764* -4.156
(2.165) (2.059) (2.024) (1.722) (2.449) (2.680)
Number of Allies 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.012* 0.008 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Major Power 0.174 0.320 0.207 1.316*** 1.357*** 0.969**
(0.275) (0.252) (0.261) (0.380) (0.389) (0.393)
Trade Openness 0.024 0.043 0.035 -0.033 -0.023 -0.006
(0.052) (0.044) (0.043) (0.096) (0.083) (0.072)
time2 0.992*** 0.765*** 0.653*** 0.614*** 0.485*** 0.426***
(0.194) (0.167) (0.188) (0.157) (0.153) (0.165)
time3 -1.081*** -0.796*** -0.674** -0.622** -0.462* -0.406
(0.324) (0.283) (0.316) (0.263) (0.255) (0.279)
Spatial rivalry 0.344** 0.713***
(0.153) (0.217)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.561*** 0.440***
(0.173) (0.146)
Strategic rivalry 0.454*** 0.592***
(0.118) (0.143)
KGD rivalry 1.281*** 1.262***
(0.139) (0.156)
Constant -1.274*** -1.788*** -2.809*** -2.061*** -2.517*** -3.269***
(0.203) (0.198) (0.251) (0.379) (0.303) (0.289)
lnalpha 0.069 -0.051 -0.170 -0.499 -0.553 -0.619*
(0.338) (0.344) (0.329) (0.372) (0.345) (0.325)
var( cons[cowcode]) 0.715*** 0.600*** 0.338***
(0.156) (0.127) (0.091)
Junta=Machine 0.83 0.47 0.69 0.55 0.79 0.92
Junta=Boss 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.10
Strongman=Machine 0.75 0.75 0.21 0.51 0.95 0.49
Strongman=Boss 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.04
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986
Log-Likelihood -2985.1 -2932.5 -2849.3 -2887.4 -2851.3 -2791.5
Table A24. Using Original GWF Measures of Party-Based and Military Regimes (monadic).
The dependent variable is Side A initiation. Negative binomial estimates with standard errors
clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace
years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled NB Random Effects NB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.044 -0.032 -0.016 0.091 -0.042 -0.038
(0.145) (0.143) (0.171) (0.148) (0.141) (0.151)
Party 0.243 0.275* 0.207 0.122 0.068 0.076
(0.174) (0.156) (0.147) (0.175) (0.167) (0.145)
Strongman 0.133 0.168 -0.069 0.290 0.117 -0.032
(0.165) (0.161) (0.159) (0.210) (0.184) (0.204)
Boss 0.490** 0.525*** 0.505*** 0.544*** 0.472** 0.406**
(0.228) (0.185) (0.184) (0.211) (0.204) (0.198)
Monarchy -0.231 -0.441* -0.545** -0.845* -0.945** -0.963**
(0.210) (0.239) (0.215) (0.505) (0.418) (0.402)
Others -0.746 -0.588 -0.970** -0.565 -0.549 -0.861*
(0.512) (0.563) (0.458) (0.650) (0.657) (0.508)
Total Borders 0.074*** 0.053*** 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.101***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.032) (0.030) (0.024)
Military Capabilities 3.918* 1.486 0.507 -3.587 -6.734*** -6.137**
(2.247) (2.228) (2.210) (2.289) (2.437) (2.772)
Number of Allies 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.010 0.005 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Major Power 0.232 0.449 0.345 1.453*** 1.521*** 1.110**
(0.287) (0.275) (0.294) (0.445) (0.473) (0.459)
Trade Openness 0.041 0.053 0.052 -0.004 0.006 0.030
(0.054) (0.047) (0.045) (0.102) (0.086) (0.074)
rtime2 0.976*** 0.788*** 0.705*** 0.665*** 0.561*** 0.500***
(0.195) (0.172) (0.199) (0.164) (0.160) (0.173)
rtime3 -1.028*** -0.792*** -0.726** -0.662** -0.528** -0.478*
(0.306) (0.278) (0.321) (0.261) (0.255) (0.283)
Spatial rivalry 0.392** 0.730***
(0.181) (0.234)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 0.563*** 0.435***
(0.201) (0.167)
Strategic rivalry 0.488*** 0.611***
(0.125) (0.157)
KGD rivalry 1.305*** 1.288***
(0.152) (0.165)
Constant -1.423*** -1.929*** -2.983*** -2.228*** -2.641*** -3.432***
(0.229) (0.220) (0.274) (0.406) (0.312) (0.307)
lnalpha 0.351 0.230 0.115 -0.192 -0.248 -0.320
(0.333) (0.342) (0.319) (0.348) (0.319) (0.300)
var( cons[cowcode]) 0.755*** 0.592*** 0.353***
(0.188) (0.150) (0.102)
Junta=Machine 0.31 0.14 0.32 0.86 0.53 0.54
Junta=Boss 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04
Strongman=Machine 0.59 0.60 0.18 0.41 0.79 0.60
Strongman=Boss 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.30 0.09 0.08
N 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986
Log-Likelihood -2505.0 -2458.6 -2390.2 -2428.8 -2397.8 -2345.5
Table A25. Using Original GWF Measures of Party-Based and Military Regimes (monadic).
The dependent variable is Revisionist initiation. Negative binomial estimates with standard
errors clustered by dyad (reported in parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of
peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.6 Using Alternative Measures of KGD Territorial Rivalries
The primary measure of KGD Territorial Rivalries is a binary variable that takes the value of
one when a rivalry’s most frequent reason for militarized disputes is territory. I reestimate
the models of MID initiations with alternative measures of KGD Territorial Rivalries: the
percentage of rivalry MIDs fought over territory, the percentage of rivalry years with territorial
disputes, as coded in an updated version of Huth and Allee (2002), and a binary indicator of
contiguous KGD Rivalries. The main results hold with these alternative measures of KGD
Territorial Rivalries. See Tables A26 and A27.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.329 0.899*** 0.566*** 1.204*** 1.204*** 1.268***
(0.237) (0.229) (0.195) (0.223) (0.223) (0.217)
% of territorial MIDs under KGD rivalry 2.607*** 3.513*** 3.513***
(0.284) (0.330) (0.330)
% of KGD rivalry years with territoiral disputes 1.790***
(0.339)
Contiguous rivalry (KGD) 1.937*** 2.302***
(0.168) (0.166)
Junta 0.563*** 0.546*** 0.465*** 0.273** 0.273** 0.261*
(0.161) (0.160) (0.157) (0.138) (0.138) (0.136)
Machine 0.329** 0.268** 0.288** 0.468*** 0.468*** 0.481***
(0.137) (0.135) (0.140) (0.129) (0.129) (0.126)
Strongman 0.566*** 0.551*** 0.379** 0.439** 0.439** 0.358**
(0.165) (0.161) (0.151) (0.174) (0.174) (0.177)
Boss 1.035*** 1.026*** 0.974*** 1.219*** 1.219*** 1.244***
(0.156) (0.155) (0.151) (0.167) (0.167) (0.170)
Monarchy -0.197 -0.263 -0.272 -0.763*** -0.763*** -0.687***
(0.214) (0.213) (0.186) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226)
Others 0.375 0.310 0.091 0.408 0.408 0.034
(0.415) (0.418) (0.377) (0.401) (0.401) (0.363)
Power Parity 0.473*** 0.461*** 0.437*** 0.752*** 0.752*** 0.730***
(0.157) (0.155) (0.151) (0.167) (0.167) (0.164)
Capabilities, Side A 7.218*** 7.535*** 6.476** 7.021*** 7.021*** 7.457***
(2.267) (2.138) (2.762) (1.750) (1.750) (1.695)
Capabilities, Side B 6.852*** 7.488*** 6.207** 9.685*** 9.685*** 9.676***
(2.384) (1.981) (2.781) (1.793) (1.793) (1.804)
Major Power A 0.294 0.275 0.431 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.978***
(0.378) (0.355) (0.443) (0.293) (0.293) (0.298)
Major Power B 0.813** 0.719** 0.929** 1.370*** 1.370*** 1.437***
(0.400) (0.352) (0.450) (0.342) (0.342) (0.349)
Alliance Similarity -0.763*** -0.702*** -0.556*** -0.670*** -0.670*** -0.634***
(0.158) (0.163) (0.163) (0.197) (0.197) (0.201)
Contiguous Dyad 3.361*** 3.380*** 2.867*** 4.592*** 4.592*** 4.133***
(0.148) (0.151) (0.157) (0.203) (0.203) (0.211)
Trade Dependence 2.755 -4.319 4.017 4.319 4.319 9.230
(5.318) (6.886) (6.636) (8.626) (8.626) (7.414)
Constant -6.173*** -6.113*** -6.390*** -9.767*** -9.767*** -9.825***
(0.211) (0.200) (0.244) (0.325) (0.325) (0.336)
var( cons[dyadid]) 4.093*** 4.093*** 3.961***
(0.395) (0.395) (0.410)
Junta=Machine 0.18 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.15
Junta=Boss 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.14 0.07 0.53 0.87 0.87 0.48
Strongman=Boss 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -5903.8 -5950.4 -5851.2 -5458.9 -5458.9 -5418.3
Table A26. Using Alternative Measures of KGD Territorial Rivalries (dyadic). The
dependent variable is Side A initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by
dyad (reported in parentheses). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.434 0.997*** 0.628*** 1.069*** 1.351*** 1.111***
(0.274) (0.260) (0.220) (0.266) (0.279) (0.258)
% of territorial MIDs under KGD rivalry 2.578*** 3.197***
(0.338) (0.361)
% of KGD rivalry years with territoiral disputes 1.907*** 2.853***
(0.385) (0.337)
Contiguous rivalry (KGD) 1.960*** 2.204***
(0.177) (0.185)
Junta 0.543*** 0.542*** 0.447** 0.227 0.196 0.236
(0.192) (0.191) (0.186) (0.167) (0.172) (0.166)
Machine 0.491*** 0.437*** 0.447*** 0.659*** 0.629*** 0.668***
(0.143) (0.143) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.139)
Strongman 0.681*** 0.659*** 0.507*** 0.614*** 0.618*** 0.545***
(0.170) (0.170) (0.163) (0.189) (0.190) (0.192)
Boss 1.174*** 1.178*** 1.124*** 1.404*** 1.438*** 1.420***
(0.169) (0.170) (0.165) (0.179) (0.180) (0.183)
Monarchy -0.284 -0.365 -0.371 -0.824*** -0.843*** -0.783***
(0.277) (0.275) (0.249) (0.289) (0.293) (0.296)
Others -0.277 -0.331 -0.525 -0.128 -0.180 -0.355
(0.519) (0.520) (0.506) (0.519) (0.520) (0.488)
Power Parity 0.570*** 0.562*** 0.534*** 0.925*** 0.918*** 0.898***
(0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.186) (0.186) (0.184)
Capabilities, Side A 6.956*** 7.303*** 5.888* 5.809*** 6.331*** 6.488***
(2.478) (2.356) (3.052) (1.934) (1.921) (1.844)
Capabilities, Side B 6.379** 7.286*** 5.856* 9.279*** 9.666*** 9.339***
(2.714) (2.263) (3.168) (2.006) (1.912) (2.021)
Major Power A 0.130 0.092 0.255 0.863*** 0.836** 0.836**
(0.404) (0.380) (0.469) (0.331) (0.336) (0.334)
Major Power B 0.902** 0.774** 0.984** 1.566*** 1.551*** 1.602***
(0.426) (0.378) (0.480) (0.365) (0.363) (0.372)
Alliance Similarity -0.614*** -0.543*** -0.412** -0.488** -0.456** -0.440**
(0.180) (0.185) (0.183) (0.217) (0.220) (0.220)
Contiguous Dyad 3.293*** 3.299*** 2.805*** 4.570*** 4.638*** 4.081***
(0.166) (0.170) (0.170) (0.234) (0.244) (0.241)
Trade Dependence 4.815 -1.798 6.613 6.827 4.413 11.470
(5.368) (6.188) (5.736) (8.422) (8.854) (7.171)
Constant -6.531*** -6.511*** -6.725***-10.398***-10.449***-10.394***
(0.245) (0.233) (0.274) (0.392) (0.404) (0.403)
var( cons[dyadid]) 4.534*** 4.738*** 4.320***
(0.503) (0.514) (0.513)
Junta=Machine 0.80 0.60 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
Junta=Boss 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.24 0.16 0.70 0.81 0.95 0.51
Strongman=Boss 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862 849862
Log-Likelihood -4837.5 -4863.6 -4792.3 -4468.8 -4483.3 -4434.4
Table A27. Using Alternative Measures of KGD Territorial Rivalries (dyadic). The
dependent variable is Revisionist initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by
dyad (reported in parentheses). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.7 Using Alternative Samples
In the main text, I use the full sample including all directed dyad-years. I here use alternative
samples to test the relationship between military dictatorships and conflict propensity. First,
I restrict the dyad sample to politically relevant dyads that include at least one major power
or two states separated by no more than 24 miles of water (Tables A28 and A29). Second, I
include only autocracies in the case of the monadic analysis or autocratic initiators in the
dyadic analysis. Tables A30 and A31 report the results. I find that the main findings hold in
both contexts.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.536*** 0.470*** 0.204 0.346** 0.236 0.163
(0.174) (0.182) (0.183) (0.169) (0.169) (0.168)
Machine 0.145 0.310** 0.225* 0.186 0.288* 0.215*
(0.161) (0.148) (0.115) (0.158) (0.149) (0.120)
Strongman 0.554*** 0.606*** 0.033 0.538** 0.483** 0.060
(0.180) (0.182) (0.159) (0.213) (0.199) (0.186)
Boss 0.396** 0.521*** 0.303* 0.535** 0.587*** 0.398**
(0.196) (0.184) (0.162) (0.217) (0.213) (0.178)
Monarchy 0.018 -0.024 -0.354* -0.358 -0.431* -0.385*
(0.222) (0.205) (0.193) (0.250) (0.240) (0.210)
Others 0.497 0.673 0.072 0.369 0.552 -0.022
(0.432) (0.467) (0.368) (0.490) (0.504) (0.395)
Power Parity 0.450** 0.591*** 0.512** 0.824*** 0.953*** 0.781***
(0.199) (0.203) (0.217) (0.282) (0.279) (0.225)
Capabilities, Side A 3.923*** 3.814** 1.942 4.019*** 3.772** 2.455*
(1.499) (1.670) (1.528) (1.497) (1.557) (1.475)
Capabilities, Side B 4.483*** 4.396*** 3.493** 3.696** 3.745** 3.146*
(1.528) (1.655) (1.421) (1.746) (1.858) (1.634)
Major Power A -0.997* -1.385** -0.867*** -1.390*** -1.655*** -1.072***
(0.573) (0.556) (0.323) (0.464) (0.454) (0.308)
Major Power B -0.627 -0.880 -0.541 -0.569 -0.739 -0.430
(0.588) (0.575) (0.347) (0.487) (0.484) (0.326)
Alliance Similarity -0.399** -0.436** 0.050 -0.435* -0.479* -0.052
(0.167) (0.182) (0.154) (0.246) (0.247) (0.182)
Contiguous Dyad 1.219** 0.629 0.409 1.718*** 1.127*** 0.680***
(0.492) (0.461) (0.273) (0.375) (0.365) (0.259)
Trade Dependence -21.402* -15.560* -13.072 -25.557* -23.445* -16.924
(12.049) (9.389) (9.316) (14.546) (11.988) (10.296)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.679*** 1.191***
(0.161) (0.185)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.388*** 2.056***
(0.158) (0.181)
Strategic rivalry 0.454*** 0.735***
(0.112) (0.127)
KGD rivalry 2.836*** 2.908***
(0.141) (0.126)
Constant -3.180*** -3.344*** -5.063*** -5.368*** -5.434*** -5.963***
(0.535) (0.517) (0.362) (0.478) (0.473) (0.357)
var( cons[dyadid]) 2.304*** 1.958*** 0.518***
(0.296) (0.267) (0.168)
Junta=Machine 0.02 0.41 0.92 0.38 0.78 0.77
Junta=Boss 0.51 0.82 0.67 0.44 0.16 0.29
Strongman=Machine 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.30 0.39
Strongman=Boss 0.42 0.67 0.16 0.99 0.63 0.11
N 55713 55713 55713 55713 55713 55713
Log-Likelihood -3367.4 -3235.1 -2849.9 -3213.4 -3102.8 -2820.4
Table A28. MID Initiation in Politically Relevant Directed-Dyads. The dependent variable
is Side A initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in
parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.479** 0.404* 0.101 0.177 0.105 0.039
(0.223) (0.229) (0.221) (0.219) (0.217) (0.216)
Machine 0.278 0.434*** 0.371*** 0.397** 0.477*** 0.397***
(0.182) (0.164) (0.129) (0.177) (0.165) (0.135)
Strongman 0.695*** 0.716*** 0.162 0.726*** 0.672*** 0.249
(0.203) (0.191) (0.174) (0.242) (0.221) (0.205)
Boss 0.494** 0.594*** 0.375** 0.657*** 0.694*** 0.485**
(0.221) (0.204) (0.185) (0.241) (0.239) (0.201)
Monarchy -0.028 -0.100 -0.456* -0.442 -0.479 -0.475
(0.303) (0.265) (0.269) (0.330) (0.308) (0.292)
Others -0.169 0.014 -0.589 -0.251 0.013 -0.558
(0.570) (0.583) (0.571) (0.640) (0.601) (0.571)
Power Parity 0.558** 0.707*** 0.568** 1.067*** 1.175*** 0.933***
(0.235) (0.225) (0.248) (0.320) (0.308) (0.260)
Capabilities, Side A 3.694** 3.749* 1.557 2.336 2.138 1.180
(1.810) (1.990) (1.736) (1.625) (1.680) (1.620)
Capabilities, Side B 4.739*** 4.585** 3.946** 4.617** 4.447** 3.729**
(1.731) (1.897) (1.680) (1.959) (2.054) (1.859)
Major Power A -1.092 -1.479** -0.911** -1.377*** -1.549*** -0.999***
(0.676) (0.660) (0.385) (0.521) (0.511) (0.359)
Major Power B -0.620 -0.810 -0.530 -0.456 -0.527 -0.288
(0.670) (0.653) (0.398) (0.533) (0.524) (0.362)
Alliance Similarity -0.239 -0.214 0.292* -0.166 -0.185 0.239
(0.203) (0.213) (0.177) (0.285) (0.277) (0.206)
Contiguous Dyad 1.189** 0.592 0.318 1.750*** 1.180*** 0.646**
(0.568) (0.536) (0.319) (0.412) (0.403) (0.294)
Trade Dependence -17.227 -12.976 -8.007 -20.485 -19.365* -11.507
(11.999) (8.627) (8.248) (14.207) (11.559) (9.083)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.847*** 1.181***
(0.195) (0.214)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.254*** 1.791***
(0.184) (0.209)
Strategic rivalry 0.484*** 0.727***
(0.126) (0.141)
KGD rivalry 2.789*** 2.813***
(0.148) (0.142)
Constant -3.572*** -3.725*** -5.315*** -6.281*** -6.166*** -6.446***
(0.646) (0.616) (0.418) (0.547) (0.533) (0.419)
var( cons[dyadid]) 2.812*** 2.227*** 0.616***
(0.404) (0.344) (0.187)
Junta=Machine 0.30 0.89 0.24 0.33 0.10 0.10
Junta=Boss 0.95 0.48 0.30 0.09 0.04 0.09
Strongman=Machine 0.01 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.35 0.44
Strongman=Boss 0.36 0.56 0.31 0.80 0.93 0.30
N 55713 55713 55713 55713 55713 55713
Log-Likelihood -2713.0 -2609.7 -2296.8 -2567.2 -2497.7 -2271.5
Table A29. MID Initiation in Politically Relevant Directed-Dyads. The dependent variable
is Revisionist initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in
parentheses). All models include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.326** 0.146 -0.149 -0.165 -0.280* -0.357**
(0.162) (0.175) (0.174) (0.167) (0.166) (0.155)
Strongman 0.361** 0.243 -0.297** 0.193 0.055 -0.210
(0.155) (0.159) (0.148) (0.171) (0.166) (0.172)
Boss 0.656*** 0.612*** 0.450*** 0.806*** 0.758*** 0.736***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.150) (0.171) (0.170) (0.157)
Monarchy -0.389* -0.529*** -0.821*** -1.247*** -1.321*** -1.054***
(0.215) (0.202) (0.198) (0.237) (0.236) (0.230)
Others -0.014 -0.053 -0.542 -0.224 -0.212 -0.694*
(0.403) (0.418) (0.361) (0.438) (0.457) (0.386)
Power Parity 0.488*** 0.587*** 0.655*** 0.832*** 0.873*** 0.904***
(0.186) (0.187) (0.194) (0.199) (0.200) (0.190)
Capabilities, Side A 6.390** 5.839* 1.375 9.896*** 9.471*** 5.382**
(2.747) (3.437) (3.155) (2.514) (2.533) (2.173)
Capabilities, Side B 5.653*** 4.480 5.541** 9.691*** 9.259*** 8.897***
(1.950) (2.798) (2.300) (1.873) (2.079) (2.163)
Major Power A 0.055 -0.237 -0.183 -0.146 -0.432 -0.426
(0.404) (0.538) (0.445) (0.477) (0.459) (0.363)
Major Power B 0.981** 1.162** 0.632 1.818*** 1.786*** 1.042***
(0.382) (0.527) (0.423) (0.397) (0.399) (0.356)
Alliance Similarity -0.946*** -0.848*** -0.276 -0.757*** -0.683*** -0.429*
(0.182) (0.193) (0.193) (0.255) (0.258) (0.225)
Contiguous Dyad 3.738*** 3.428*** 1.943*** 5.513*** 4.900*** 3.238***
(0.161) (0.183) (0.287) (0.257) (0.270) (0.251)
Trade Dependence 16.247** 11.606 20.364*** 26.844*** 22.373*** 23.736***
(6.679) (7.354) (5.912) (6.192) (7.702) (8.081)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.682*** 1.435***
(0.234) (0.236)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.343*** 2.193***
(0.286) (0.256)
Strategic rivalry 0.373** 1.161***
(0.163) (0.193)
KGD rivalry 3.821*** 3.461***
(0.280) (0.197)
Constant -5.448*** -5.674*** -7.067*** -9.706*** -9.716*** -9.366***
(0.264) (0.289) (0.275) (0.440) (0.421) (0.346)
var( cons[dyadid]) 5.287*** 4.736*** 2.115***
(0.620) (0.584) (0.328)
Junta=Boss 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Boss 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00
Log-Likelihood -4257.37 -4172.29 -3669.01 -3876.88 -3799.80 -3519.90
Table A30. MID Initiation in Authoritarian Sample (dyadic). The dependent variable
is Side A initiation.Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in
parentheses). Machine is the baseline category. All models include a cubic polynomial of
peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Pooled logit Random Effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.204 0.054 -0.266 -0.360* -0.446** -0.520***
(0.192) (0.204) (0.197) (0.193) (0.190) (0.177)
Strongman 0.379** 0.270 -0.252 0.194 0.079 -0.180
(0.167) (0.165) (0.156) (0.184) (0.176) (0.176)
Boss 0.690*** 0.651*** 0.473*** 0.781*** 0.747*** 0.704***
(0.165) (0.165) (0.161) (0.184) (0.182) (0.169)
Monarchy -0.585** -0.715*** -1.019*** -1.510*** -1.558*** -1.288***
(0.289) (0.259) (0.266) (0.313) (0.306) (0.303)
Others -0.772 -0.800 -1.221** -0.920 -0.849 -1.156**
(0.522) (0.529) (0.512) (0.567) (0.556) (0.520)
Power Parity 0.588*** 0.673*** 0.701*** 0.980*** 1.006*** 1.009***
(0.207) (0.205) (0.214) (0.216) (0.216) (0.210)
Capabilities, Side A 6.516** 6.149* 1.642 8.643*** 8.373*** 4.750**
(2.724) (3.228) (2.882) (2.518) (2.526) (2.179)
Capabilities, Side B 5.817*** 4.544 5.542** 10.054*** 9.600*** 9.032***
(2.146) (3.091) (2.726) (2.114) (2.336) (2.492)
Major Power A 0.036 -0.234 -0.193 0.007 -0.233 -0.307
(0.412) (0.518) (0.439) (0.468) (0.455) (0.361)
Major Power B 0.880** 1.064* 0.511 1.802*** 1.785*** 0.997**
(0.406) (0.551) (0.461) (0.422) (0.429) (0.397)
Alliance Similarity -0.947*** -0.850*** -0.244 -0.719*** -0.660** -0.401*
(0.195) (0.203) (0.204) (0.268) (0.269) (0.236)
Contiguous Dyad 3.693*** 3.398*** 1.783*** 5.394*** 4.846*** 3.057***
(0.175) (0.197) (0.317) (0.279) (0.293) (0.274)
Trade Dependence 16.840** 10.651 20.974*** 26.860*** 21.755*** 23.388***
(6.635) (7.331) (5.833) (5.870) (7.197) (7.508)
Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 0.887*** 1.321***
(0.282) (0.269)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 1.010*** 1.809***
(0.333) (0.320)
Strategic rivalry 0.394** 1.072***
(0.178) (0.221)
KGD rivalry 3.813*** 3.397***
(0.304) (0.221)
Constant -5.592*** -5.760*** -7.023*** -9.963*** -9.871*** -9.328***
(0.291) (0.306) (0.279) (0.487) (0.461) (0.369)
var( cons[dyadid]) 5.520*** 4.979*** 2.185***
(0.716) (0.671) (0.358)
Junta=Boss 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Boss 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00 544338.00
Log-Likelihood -3566.68 -3509.48 -3080.59 -3247.01 -3202.59 -2958.88
Table A31. MID Initiation in Authoritarian Sample (dyadic). The dependent variable is
Revisionist initiation. Logit estimates with standard errors clustered by dyad (reported in
parentheses). Machine is the baseline category. All models include a cubic polynomial of
peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.8 Conditional Fixed Effects Estimates
The random effects model used in the main text assumes the exogeneity between the observed
covariates and the unobserved unit-specific factors. This assumption may be too strong.
Accordingly, I estimate a conditional fixed effects logit model that does not impose the
exogeneity assumption. The fixed effects estimator allows me to explore the within-unit
(country or directed-dyad) effects of military autocracies. Therefore, if either leaders’ personal
backgrounds or regime attributes are predictors of a military dictatorship’s conflict propensity,
we should be able to find that Argentina becomes more aggressive when transitioning from a
civil to a military dictatorship and not only that Argentina is more aggressive than Mexico.
However, fixed-effects perfectly predict the absence of conflict, and only dyads experiencing at
least one MID in the sample period can be included in the estimation. Accordingly, the fixed
effects model drops units in which there is no temporal variation in the outcome variable,
losing almost 98% of observations (King 2001).
Table A32 reports the results of conditional fixed effects logit models using both measures
of MID initiation, Side A initiation and Revisionist initiation. The results of Tables
A32 are similar to random effects estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3, even though the
sample is markedly reduced. This shows that my key finding is not model dependent. The
same is true of Table A33 that estimates fixed effects logit models using ICB crises. The
result remains similar to random effects estimates reported in Table A12.
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Side A initiation Revisionist initiation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Junta 0.213 0.178 0.074 0.054 0.063 -0.017
(0.173) (0.168) (0.181) (0.215) (0.206) (0.223)
Machine 0.412* 0.495** 0.378 0.651** 0.755*** 0.596**
(0.244) (0.251) (0.252) (0.268) (0.274) (0.277)
Strongman 0.721** 0.633** 0.455 0.800** 0.752** 0.518
(0.284) (0.265) (0.312) (0.337) (0.309) (0.349)
Boss 0.926*** 0.903*** 0.925*** 0.986*** 0.987*** 0.956***
(0.242) (0.244) (0.261) (0.266) (0.272) (0.296)
Monarchy -1.409*** -1.438*** -1.303*** -1.435*** -1.403*** -1.242**
(0.392) (0.400) (0.428) (0.506) (0.511) (0.546)
Others 0.486 0.655 0.120 0.008 0.389 0.086
(0.488) (0.475) (0.458) (0.646) (0.551) (0.529)
Power Parity 2.004** 2.090** 2.601*** 3.080*** 3.130*** 3.496***
(0.911) (0.944) (0.985) (1.043) (1.072) (1.176)
Capabilities, Side A 1.152 0.280 1.849 -3.652 -4.507 -2.856
(3.295) (3.380) (3.384) (3.763) (3.813) (3.873)
Capabilities, Side B 5.040* 4.917* 7.779*** 6.326** 6.103** 8.773***
(2.731) (2.922) (3.004) (2.529) (2.746) (3.156)
Alliance Similarity -0.477 -0.508 -0.482 -0.290 -0.323 -0.388
(0.419) (0.437) (0.462) (0.483) (0.498) (0.525)
Trade Dependence 5.616 2.749 2.948 14.449 10.909 11.596
(12.802) (16.250) (16.612) (8.904) (11.393) (11.684)
Time since last initiate -8.001*** -2.971 8.956***
(2.304) (2.419) (2.649)




Territorial rivalry (Strategic) 1.107*** 0.758***
(0.270) (0.287)
Territorial rivalry (KGD) 2.024*** 1.885***
(0.208) (0.284)
Strategic rivalry 1.184*** 0.940***
(0.192) (0.229)
KGD rivalry 2.315*** 2.189***
(0.143) (0.168)
Junta=Machine 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.03
Junta=Boss 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Strongman=Machine 0.23 0.58 0.78 0.62 0.99 0.79
Strongman=Boss 0.42 0.23 0.09 0.52 0.35 0.13
N 19836 19836 19836 16414 16414 16414
Log-Likelihood -2810.7 -2737.9 -2572.7 -2135.1 -2096.7 -1973.7
Table A32. Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Estimates (using MID data). All models include




Junta 0.758** 0.653* 0.464
(0.353) (0.345) (0.345)
Machine 0.898*** 1.038*** 0.682*
(0.328) (0.372) (0.390)
Strongman 1.362*** 1.298*** 1.145**
(0.408) (0.456) (0.471)
Boss 0.790** 0.972*** 0.777*
(0.361) (0.371) (0.401)
Monarchy -0.178 -0.073 0.147
(0.685) (0.766) (0.757)
Others 1.300** 1.308** 0.812
(0.519) (0.610) (0.630)
Power parity -1.438** -1.657** -1.641**
(0.568) (0.656) (0.699)
Capabilities, State A 5.584* 7.021* 10.218**
(2.872) (3.858) (4.160)
Capabilities, State B 4.869* 8.476*** 9.793***
(2.488) (3.056) (2.921)
Allied dyad 0.350 0.584* 0.511
(0.272) (0.344) (0.337)
Spatial Strategic rivalry 0.923*
(0.501)






Junta=Machine 0.73 0.36 0.61
Junta=Boss 0.94 0.42 0.45
Strongman=Machine 0.29 0.60 0.34
Strongman=Boss 0.13 0.37 0.32
N 11344 9682 9682
Log-Likelihood -1243.9 -1098.1 -1050.5
Table A33. Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Estimates (using ICB crises). All models
include a cubic polynomial of peace years. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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